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J. H. HAAN
This limited franchise might be called the first characteristic of the voting structure in Shanghai. The second was the existence of proxy voting, that is voting by people present at a Public Meeting acting as agents of and voting for persons not present.
Neither in the 1845 Land Regulations nor in those of 1854 had any provision for proxy voting been made, yet even before 1854 it was widely used, so we might put the question as to when it was introduced.
The first time the matter was considered at a Public Meeting was on June 14, 1851, when the problem was raised as "to whether persons holding special powers of Attorney to deal with the land of parties absent could claim a vote on their behalf at a Public Meeting in addition to their own" 27 It was then argued that "such a system... had never been adopted at Public Meetings of this nature at Shanghai" and consul Alcock was not inclined "to admit the principle on the present occasion”.
However, there were apparently some difficulties of a legal nature involved and Alcock thought it wise to consult the Attorney General at Hong Kong, whose advice was negative. Earlier I have drawn attention to the fact that the merchants at Shanghai were very self-conscious as to their self-government and the resolution against the interference from Hong Kong has already been referred to. At the same Public Meeting of May 25, 1852, it was decided, by resolution no. 2, "That all holders of Land within the British limits may specially appoint an Attorney to act for them in their absence; and further that one person may act as Attorney for several renters, and be entitled to vote for each proprietor he may be duly empowered to represent".28
As from that date proxy voting became the established practice at Shanghai and it was incorporated in article XIX of the 1869 Land Regulations.
There were evident dangers in this mode of voting. The already rather oligarchical procedure at a Public Meeting might be still more monopolized if a great number of votes were collected by some persons who might then be able to corner the meeting. Moreover, less scrupulous voters might be willing to sell their own vote to the highest bidder. It should be stressed