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recommendations for ultimate implementation." Appearing on the master list was the subject "Treatment by United States Occupation Forces of Special Areas: Hong Kong."59
The Department of State was first invited to submit a paper, bearing on the political aspects of the question, to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. After considerable deliberation the department concluded that in view of the political differences between China and Great Britain regarding the future status of Hong Kong, United States forces should not participate in operations for the reconquest or occupation of Hong Kong unless absolutely necessary from a military point of view, and that the United States should make no plans to participate in military government in Hong Kong which, according to the previous agreement of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, was to be instituted by Britain.60
On receiving the department's recommendation, and after consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East submitted a draft report in mid-June. Apart from reiterating the Department of State principle of non-involvement, the report further pointed out that while the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to substantial United States participation in the Canton-Hong Kong operation, it was a Chinese operation under Chiang Kai-shek and not an operation conducted by United States forces under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore should not regard themselves as obligated, in so far as the Canton-Hong Kong operation was concerned, to the civil affairs agreement with the British. Moreover, China was not a signatory to this agreement, and it did not cover the situation in the case of a Japanese withdrawal from Hong Kong. The subcommittee accordingly recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff inform the British Chiefs of Staff that United States support of the operation was being furnished to attain strictly military ends, and that arrangements with regard to the civil affairs administration of Hong Kong should be worked out between Britain and China.61 This document, with some minor alterations, was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee by the end of July. The suggestion that Chiang Kai-shek should be consulted with regard to civil affairs in Hong Kong was naturally unpalatable to Britain.62
The news that Japan would accept defeat in the near future changed the entire picture. Britain now decided to secure the