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pital January 1949, to Elizabeth, Wife of Group Captain J. N. Jefferson, Royal Air Force, a
SOT).
IN MEMORIAM
mentry
01
Alexandre F. Delgado who passed away un 6th January 1942.
stage in the dispute-out the
have been any earlier
"
THE CHINA MAIL, THURSDAY, JANUARY 6, :1949.
THE FIFTIETH INSTALMENT
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
that
Kame
Gen. Dwight D.
for reparations to such countries France, Belgium, Holland,
-fix
Eisenhower's embern, Norway and Russia.
Own Story Of The War In Europe
The warmaking power of the Country ahould be eliminated. Possibly this could be done by strict controls on inilustries using heavy fabricating machinery by the mere expedient of provent- it any manufacture of airplanes. The Germans should be permitted
In sustaining his argument, the ment the Prime Minister was sun-one of which was to separate him accomplished.
ported by cortain members of his self habitually from his stal. He
Ile
ĉi-lon.
quarters.
WAS
described
that a postwar situation which sible to a supreme commander. It was won in Europe. Ife ani. could
ed
капи
stable
what
in own way.
who,
then
Chapter 16
05
We
to Mike
מי
any
U.S.
Army Hodges. These two, forming the U.S. Twelfth Army Group, were widder command of General Brad- ley. On the left was the British
under Twenty-first Arming Group General Montgomery. Iris Comprised the Army under
British Secon General
and the Canadian First under Lieutenant General Henry G. Crerar. The British air
O force supporting General Mont-
that
wel Hodges' army.
Another factor was that the. American Government had gone to great expense to equip and supply a number of French divisions. These troops Baturally wanted to fight in the Untile for the libera- tion of France. At no other point would they fight with the ardour nid devotion, and nowhere else could they obtain needed re-
for
loases. battle H.K.818.00 placement-
These troops were located in Italy An usual the Prime Minister, after month, a degree of teamwork; and required to make their own
co-operation that living, and should not be support-1 H.K.$30.00
and North Afrien, and the only pursued the argument un to the and intensive 1LK.$72.00
way they could be brought quickly very moment of execution. As made incidente such as I have de-ed by Amerien. Therefore chak- into the battle was through the usual, also, the second that he saw rcribed excoptional. When these ing off hatural resources would bo opening in the South of France. ho could not gain his own way, he exceptiona Arose they had to be folly."
emphatically repudiated one' 1 firmly believed
the threw everything he had into thrushed out firmly and decisively
the operation. He and an answer.given. The wonder suggestion I had heard that the greatest possible concentration of support of Paul S. troops should be effected in the flew to the Mediterranean to wit- is that so few of them ever be Ruhr mines should be flooded. This seemed silly and criminal to with joy grent stretch between Switzerlandness the attack and I heard that came of a serious nature.
Field Marshal Montguinery, like me. Finally. I said that the milj. of Germany son, and the North Sen, whence we he was actually on n destroyer to
When General Patton's Third 5th would most quickly break into the observe the supporting nombard-General Patton, conformed to no tary government
from military to civil Army Headquarters enme into He deliberately purious, outs as quickly as this could be action on August our ground гуре. My heart of Germany and join up meat.when the attack went in
eventually with the Red forces
urgenisation expanded to four In this long and serioas argu-cortain eccentricities of behaviour. lants as advancing from the East,
These views were presented to urmies. On the right Was the Prime Miulete pictured a bloody start. On the other hand, British lived in a trailer, surrounded by everyone who queried me on the S. Third Anny under General
fow aider. This created dieul subject, both
and later. Patton. Next to him the ath prospect for the forces attacking officers assigned to my own head lies in the stuff work that must be they were eventually placed be First
General under from the South. felt sure quarters stood firmly by performed in timely and effective fore the President and the Scere they would be involved for many throughout. week in attemptst to reduce th Although in the planning days fashion if any battle is to resultary of State when they came to
.victory.
conalstently Potsdam in July 1945. Coastal defences and feared they of early 1914, Montgomery had
ould not advance as for North-advocated the complete abandon refused to deal with a staff offger ward as Lyen in less than three ment of the Southern operation in from any headquarters other than mouths, ife thought we would
order to secite more landing craft his own, and, in argument, uffer great losses and insisted for Overlord, be now, in sarly portistent up to the point of de- that the battlefield in that region August, agreed with me that the The harm that this practice PURSUIT AND THE
merely would become
another attack should,go in as planned. Anzio It possible the Prime Coincidentally with Us's drawn could have created was minimised
by the presence in the Twenty- BATTLE OF SUPPLY Minister did not credit theout discussion; fontgomery sud-first Army Group of a chief of
uthentielly of our Intellizonen only proposed to me that he
Cormery's army group was cum- DURING THE PERIOD reports, but we were confident that should retain tactical co-ordinat tall who had an ouviable reputa
tion and standing in the entire TAXI STRIKE few German forces other than ing control of all ground forces Allied Force. He was Major THE BATTLE OF THE Beach-manded by Air Marshal Coning- General Bradley's army General Francis de Guingand, head the enemy kept his Fifteen-ham, Failure of the belated Gov-argely immobile divisions remain doughout the campaign: This
ext in the South. Consequently we told him, was impossible, parti- «Freddy" to all his associates in th
Army concentrated in the group was supported by the US. ernment effort to effect a were sure that the German de-cularly in view of the fact that he SHAEF and in other high head- Calals region. He was convinced Ninth Air Force commanded by to launch an Major General Hoy S. Vanden- compromise in the taxi strike,
fensive and would be quickly wanted to retain at the esine lime
He lived the code of the that we intended
berg. Subordinate General although it had to be tried,ierced and that Devers's troops direct command of his own army Allies and his tremendous capn-amphibious attack against re-Vandenberg Were Major General leaves the situation rather would pour Northward at a ran group. To my mind and to that elty. ability, and energy were fortress stronghold and as a re-
refused to use Otto
It. Weyland in charge of of my staff the proposition was always devoted to the co-ordina-sult stubbornly worse, if anything, than it pace.
Although I never heard him say fantastic. The reason for having
Third was before the attempt was
employed porting General Patton's so, I fell hint the Prime Minister's an army group commander is to tion of plan and detail that was those forces to reinforce the Nor- the Tactical Air Command sup
mandy garrison. mucie.
Montgomery is best Nothing has changed real concern was possibly of jure direct, day-by-day batilo absoltely essential to victory.
confirm Army, and Major General El- every possible in actual fact-neither skle political rather than a military field, direction in a specific portion by himself in a letter he wrote him in his misconception: General wood R. Quesada, who command- the air units supporting He may have thought of the front, to a degree imposto ma shortly after the victory McNair, for instance, was in the ed as far as can be seen is any nature.
that European theatre more prepared to take the
would see the Western Allies post is certain that no one man esuld, Doar Ike.
him, Bemi- refer in 10 Now that we have all signed in publicily, first step towards meeting the in great strength in the Bal-perform this function with respect
com- ani army
In each of these armies' ant other half-way than they would be far more effective to his own portion of the line and Berlin I suppose we shall soon
although his army was army groups the normal mission
only. name was the air n producing
Jogical begin to run own post at the same time exe hostilities world than if the kur and intelligent supervision over both the, before the fappens, to pin one censored list, but we to carry out stacles requested by privilege and took care to see that, In the the respective ground cornman- collapse of what appeared to an armies should be the ones to any other portion. The only effect sa
However, all tactical air I told him of such a scheine would have been an honour it has been to occupy that region.
serve United Kingdom, the secret was ders. final bid to
Thus represent
Axis units were subordinate to Leigh- hat if this were his reason for to place Montgomery in position to under you. I owe much to your an open one,
certain that Mallory ent would feel
and consequently all. achieve an agreement comes advocating the campaign into the draw at will, in support of his wise güldange and kindly forbear ogent at a time when the companies Balkans he should go instantly to own lens, upon the strength of ance. I know my own faults very knowledge of his presence was both American and British, coukt well and I do not suppose I am an important Information, to bej emergency be employed as a have succeeded so far in the President and lay the facts the entire command.
Is well as his own conclusions, on A supreme commander in Deasy subordinate; I like To my passed promptly to the Germans muss against any target designat- strike-breaking tactics that
15% I well understood that situation such as faced he table.
A typical exam- we hoped, would interpret et by SHAEF.
was the the temper of the Union driv-
trategy can be affected by pol-Europe cannot ordinarily give
be an ple of unified action But you have kẹp! me un the ala "army's" „mission to 'cal' ers is dangerous. The official
considerations, and if
and the day-by-day
hour-by-hour
and bave taught me much.
helping to defeat the German at- front. Initiative towards mediation. President and the Prime Minister supervision to any portion of the aborticult and stormy times, assault against the Pas de Calais work of the British air forces in
For all this I am very grateful.
Finally the enemy began to tack against Mortain in Bradley's soundly motivated though it should decide that it was warts field. Nevertheless, he is the one
clearer obtain .a
view of the sector, Owing to this flexibility was, badly misfired, for in the while to prolong the war, thereby person in the organisation with And I thank you for all you have
and the authority to assign principal done for me.
the Tactical Air situation; we quickly knew this. In cornmanel, result the offer made repre- increasing its cost in meh
money, in order to secure the poli-objectives to major formations. Your very devoted friend,
Identification of hostile units on Forces were also available, when Monty. sented no genuine advance
ical objectives they deemed neces- He is also the only one who has on what the drivers had al- ary, then
the bombers were In my reply I said, with cam the front is one of the continuous needed, to support the bombers, I would instantly and under his hand the power to aflat
objectives of all battlefeld In- even when telligence activities. From
this proceeding to penetrations deep ready emphatically rejected.oyally adjust my plane necording strength to the various major completo truth:
mands in accordance with their Your own high place among Information we daily construct-within Germany. Rather the reverse, for every v. But I did insist that as long
she argued the matter on mill missions, to arrange for the dis military leaders of your country fe
remarkable day has seen an increase in rounds alone 1 could no tribution of incoming supply, and armly fixed, and it has never beened, normally with
accuracy. the "Enemy Order of the number of scab" driv-concede validity to his arguments. to direct the operations of the easy for me to disagree with what Battle, which revealed in late proximate strength of the Allied Continent was ers working for the taxi com- folt that in thix particular entire uir forces in support of any knew to be your real convictions.
American divisions, panies and as they refuse to field 1 alone had to be the Judge portion of the line. The existence. But it will always be a great privi-July that the German had start- forces on reinstate mare of the strikers of my own responsibilities and therefore, of any separate ground tege to bear,evdence to the faced the divisions of the Fifteenth wenty
lecisions.
1 refused to consider headquarters between the supreme that whenever decision was made Army across the Seine to join in twelve British divisions, three were too late, Canadian divisions, one French, the battle. They than are required to complete the change so long as it was urged commander and an army group regardles o! your personal
There if and one Palish division. additional soldier who and Every would have placed opinion, your loyalty and efficiency
no more British divisions their staffs, the tendency on military considerations. He commander
in
the such
I available,
United headquarters at in execution were to be counter then came into the Normandy were must be to increase the re
lid not admit that political factors
amanamalous position, since it would upon with certainty.
area was merely caught up Kingdom were an mitional six
with sistance and solidity of the were influencing him, but I
Another interesting, flest the catastrophe.of
American divisions. Including Th strikers. It was more on this certain that no experienced have had the power neither to
soldier would question the, wisdom. direct the flow of supply and rein prossing, discussion
took place out exercising any pa
strength of all available air forces issue than upon any other strictly from the military viewforcement nor to give instructions with Secretary In that three nirborne. The operational
involved, also, a was approximately
1035 heavy divisions that the bombers, 1720 light, medium, and that the crisis arose. The at-point. of adhering to the plan for to the air forces for the applica, visit to our headquarters in early defeat were
tion of their grout power.
August 1944 he said that the rate number of titude of the employers is, of stacking Southern France.
Modera British practice had of monetary exchange, to be even enemy had been able to spare forpedo bombers, und 5000 night- course, easily understood.
from Germany from the South of France. been, however, to maintain three tually established In
ers. Added to all this was the
Transport Some of the men who have'
Command, Germany
Itscif. When the total, for navy. that country any advantage. joined them since the com- bring the parties to agree-cheon ground, ono go for air, should be such as to avoid giving Brittany, from Holland, and Ecom Troop mencement of the strike have ment. The Commissioner of And departure from this system candidly told him that I had been of these reinforcements had not which, counting both American ed more than 2000 transport risked their limbs, if not their Labour rightly rejects the seemed to many inconceivable and far too busy to be specifically con- proved equal to the task of stop-and British formations, numbe
I carefully cerned with the future economy of ping Us, the enimy was planes. lives, in maintaining a taxi inginuations of a leaning in to invite disaster. service. To discharge them favour of the employers. The explained that in.a.thoutru so.vast Germany but that I had an able momentarily helpless to present
This brought about aladvance. now would be morally in- Labour Department has how as our och army group comman- staff section working on the pro- any continuous front against our
der would be the ground comman-blom. defensible (if morals enter ever opened itself to attack der in chief for his particular genoral conversation on the sub into business relationships). for its purely negative area; instead of the there would feet of Germany's future and I On the other hand, it asks approach. Neutrality is all be three so-called commanders in expressed myself roughly ne tol:ļ
chief for the ground and each low. much of the strikers to very well, but when there is would be supported by his own “These things are for someon? choose which of their num- danger of a strike becoming tactical air force. bers shall accept re-employ-protracted-and particularly ment and which shall go when circumstances are such cominander to concentrate the the conclusion
alr forces, including the must be no room for doubt na to jobless or what is perhaps that inconvenience to, the re commands,.on.any front as who won the war. Germany mul even worse to ask them to public can be reduced to nonded, while the strength of each be occupied. More than this, the consent to a position in which minimum-a policy of step-army.group.would be varied. from Uerman people must not be allow- the employers shall choose ping aside and letting events time, to time depending on the im- ed to escape a sense of guilt, of Prominent. engulfed the world. from their numbers who they shape their own course can portance of enemy positions to the complicity in the tragedy that ha will reinstate and who they easily be misconstrued., PORTERS of the whole force.
Vbile my decision was undoubt- Nazis, along with certain indus will not. In the course of Here, of course, the Commisedly distasteful to individuals who trialists, must be tried and punish. a different ed. Membership in the Gestap the strike they, and other sioner is severely handicap had been raised. In a In dif- and in the BS should be taken as members of the Motor Carved by the terms of local school, it was accepted. Drivers' Association, have re- labour legislation. He can i ferent form the question was prima facie evidence of guilt. Th sorted to various methods of invite the parties to submit raised at a later stage of the cur- General Staff must be broken up. paign, but the decision was al- all its archives confiscated, and intimidation. In challenge to their case to arbitration, but ways the same."
members suspected of complicity strike-breaking methods. refusal by one of them and In spite of such occasional dif- in starting the war or in any way Whatever opinion, may be the strikers have refused, on rerences of convicten, there was in crime should be tried. The Ger. held of this campalen, it auto- at least three occasions and our day-by-day operations, month man nation should be responsible matically rules out any possi-have thereby .cast doubts.on bility of consent to алу the strength of their case... arrangement which would ends the opportunity of permit of victimisation by hearing. There is no provi: the employersf those sion which compels either known to have been most party to a trade dispute to active in causing and foster subrait to arbitration and this ing strike action. In short, is the underlying weakness the position is extremely dif- of our labour laws and the ficult and there seems to be main reason for the impasse no ready formula offering a which has been reached in solution of the problem. This..the taxi strike, and created would be bad enough in the conditions for yet more KONG? itself. It takes on added serious potantialities. And gravity when indications are the conclusion? Clearly the that the more militant of the Government cannot throw up
Pasith 1pcal unigna have seen all-its-hands, in despair. round menace in the attempt. tive gation to end the conflict talan at strike-breaking and that is now essential, even' If : it wi ja, the risk of sympathetic walk- means the invoking of Emar outs cannot, by any maons,mency Regulations to enforce be negatived. The Govern-kon: Impartial Bottlement. ment has been criticised Decisions must be made be notably by the strikers, for fore the situation threatens
hand. itsatitude, its failure to logat
Back of all else to decide, but my personal would be the power of the suprense opinion is that, following upon the
DO YOU
'.
KNOW
YOUR HONG
of hostilities, thers}
By the end of August the ap-
the
but
a
To Be Continued
Star Bright
End
to the
Amontillado Fino SHERRY
PRODUCE OF SPAIN
CALDBECKS
2