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THE CHINA MAIL, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1948. .
THE THIRTEENTH INSTALMENT
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
With these general ideas in
Cherbourg; the desirable features
mind but with no detailed stu Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's
D. Eisenhower's of that project were merely list
1.
and nie.'
Own Story Of The War In Europe
In
Whatever
พรส
siderable recovery in the ex- for manyus oprations he Gnek ruuld not take pincel West coast of France with
MANILA reached
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APB5'
19
the
In
reinforcement
WAS
Britisk
the of
flac
thus
because the
uf
of
he
hast
dies upon which to make a fria
It would have initialed a small conciualon, I went to an informal
""second_front" ni once and woukl meeting with the British Chiefs
have launched our first offensive of Staff. Shortly after the con-
effort in the direction and along ference began I was in fted to
the same line that would later be 24354 present my general views con-
taken by our full-out assault. cerning the nature of the pro-
event the Combined 33312jected operation. Speaking as a
ንሕስያ American planner assigned to that we donned a prerequisite to
attempted in Chief of Staff first concluded the War Department in Washing successful Invasion. The second 1042 would necessarily be on that it would be unprofitable and uneconomical to attempt diree: much smaller scale than the con-unee Is that the British fifcet, neces- 4.net with
idea that no HK$18.00 Wild later be assigned to e-salty holding itself in reserve it toroplated Invasion of Europe ond. rem
as possible, it should not Eighth Army then in Egypt. Or sain,
substance, "The alt mer to meet my threat of a I suld, in
the German surface seriously cut into the production this there was unanimous agree- ruent. The Brillsh and Amerl- H.K.$36.00 first thing to do is to name a com- sortie
That Rev Catred not mander for the operation.
provide the ami preparatory programme then must be given every bit of amount of direct support and the getting under way to make pos- can Chiefs of Staff had therefore to accide, in Inte July 1942, be H.K. $72.00 man
sower that both governments can ensity of inval bombardment site the final major operation,
le must that would be required for suc- The President had specifically seen the North West African in- make available to him. be directed to plan for an invasion essful inpdings.
ordered the United States Chiefs vasion and the seizing of a bridge.
timing, and the circumstances of In land forces, also, the British of Staff to lameh some kind of head in North West France. WORLD RECOVERY [of Europe on the basis that it will
As far as I know, there was no attack might have had a serious certainly be successful, at
Counter-offensive ground action In tenst
were badly stretched,
argument based upon nationalistic psychological effect on all those The world's economy is re-
to the extent of establishing on the comunitments In India, European zone in 1942.
jiues, The conferees were mere- who were convinced that victory I view of these circumstances euvering Mounting evidence the Continent a solid front cap- the Mities Fast, and their pre-
the Western there seemed to be three kies of searching for the most profit could not be attained except by carrying out effective various Infan shows this quite clearly and able o
could not possibly netion deserving of earnest study. abte Bne of combined petion to offensive aimet directly at
be undertaken in 1942.
the rny's concisiritul vitala progress in Britain and West-operation against the German, Dese
ไบ the new. Invasion The first was the direct rein- The must be directed instantly to an are
Only July 24 it was defermin-But fortunately the decision to ern Europe is steady and
are then sume fteen divisions forcement of the British armites
we found that in the in the Middle East win the Caped to proceed with the planning stuck Afrien deutely did not ang uban- gend. The 1948 report of the Prepare his outline plan al to
arbmit to the Chiels of Staff his really.
by the Combined International Monetary Fund requirements not only in troops putter of Inading craft, special Good Hope route: in an effort for the invasion of North West Constiune or hoply
te-tro Honiei and Jus army Africa with an Allied force of all comment qpment, mal the great stores all kinds but in all types of
Chiefs of Staff of their deter concisely sULTERS much
opmaganden, The mination to carry nut, when of the progress. In Europe,additional equipment land, son, of maternal reserves that would and, by capturing Tripolitania, tons, to be carried out under na
con Amerienz
ane prastiebie. ue necessary the British were not gain svetre control is the
the Invasion uperation received despue the handicaps of pour The
Allira Mediterranean, Best question asked mel Intel better off than we.
Its execution was op- Europe by the route neross the ha ment that there was a huge The second was to prepare am-fusch.
The African harvests and shortages of at. "And who would you name
Les seize Naeth proved by the President on July English Channel,
lookvil Age 75 enal and other essentials, incominder of this expedi-jel neguming a major Invasion of phibious forces
governments agreed venture was Trope until America could pen West Airlea with the idea of un-25. Both
In character but dirtriui prouetan in 1917 Lon?"
Sant thinking of an operation the necessary land, sen, and terlating later operations to the that the whole venture shuula diverslunarg was almost 10 per cent great.
nady 1913, when the British power to participate in the Eastward to enter Hommet in a lave, initially at feast, a cum-necessitated by the circumstantes
American open photoly
complexion of the moment and in the hope er than in i. At the end
would hressarily provide the nitial operation on at least on gant vice and eventually
basis of 1947 nearly all European ajor portion of the forces dur. equal
and prepared, this
Atzien wall receive the layod-| great results. The least by the United Nations. countries ind reached or exitial singes. I repiled, in Jereafter, to provide the great entre Mediterranean for use is hope was that French North that from it we would achieve ck of the groomt and ul units The third was to undertake o in troops with no more than these results was that North West centiv their pre-war output. ¦ Anerken 1 have heard much of a
who has been intensively hat would be needed. Moreover, mitest operation on the North nominal show of resistance, and Afrien would be denial to the a submarine and air- the chances of this favourable de Axis for 4 - cort-studying There had also been
Next, it was expect- I understand, until American industry could latively small force but with ab-etmanent were considered to be craft base.
If the operation on the through an advance to the vast
limited to the capture of much brighter Jectives amount
Eastward Malta would The that his position is Chief of Com-Largely supply pansion of exparts. Marshall entries appeared ined Operations, and I think his special equipment and supples en area that could be held against was advertised as purely Ameri- the
The nal hope ex- British standing in France succoureci. That would be necessary.
German attack and which would at. in fact to have raised their name Admiral Mountbatten.
Anyone will be
be better than none; It became increasingly doubt inter forth a badgehead for use was at low bb because of the pressed at that early date was in that all North Africa might be entful to the American headquarters in the large-scale invasion agreed Ori Dakar, and Syrian texport volume Just year by auch in operation cannot be cat a full-out attack could be upon as the ultimate objective, eldents, in which British forces cleared of the Axts; and that the
30 per cent above 1940 and ried out under committer com“ › Munched in the early spring of The places indleated were
the and come into open conflict with Mediterranean, at least along its in fatal were only some 10 tomand
Southern shores, could be used But I have heard 12043. and because it would be ex-¡ Cotentin Peninsula or the Brit- the French. 115 per
of the United cent behind 1938. | Admiral Mountbatten is vigorous.
la ta
the; by the convoys This proposed
headquarters in many l'eninsula. ¡Some
eliminating the countries
intelligent, and courageous, and ftremely hazardous to begin actually nic
to be staged for operation across the English operatia vas called Sledgehan luridge Hotel on July 26, Gen Nations, the operation is
eral Marshall informed me that tont route around the Cape of pre-war
export initimly with British forces pre- Channel in the fall of the year as other course of action scem-; was to be the Allied comman-]
reach both the Good Hope to volumes while Britain suc-eminating I assume he could do we began to realise that large-
and India. The der in chief of the expedition. Middle East ceeded in exporting eight per the job."
scale invasion might not be posed feasible at the moment.
Curiously enough, it was be- discussions were long and exhaus-le stated that while this decision nable before the spring of 1044. cent more than in 1938.
officers that My remarks were greeted with ble
definite
some time lleved by little some Then Gen-
This was a bitter possibility to tive. A najor (nelor in all Am- Compared with pre-war the un amazed allence. Western hemisphere, in view erat Brooke said. "General, pos- contemplate. It was bitter for crican thinking of that time was would be necessary to accomplish even if we succeeded in driving of its freedom from war de-ibly you have not met Admiral urselves, for our Chiefs of Stoft, a lively suspicion that the British all the routine of official designa- Remmel out of Africa we would
the Mountbatten. This la he sitting and far more so for the political contemplated agreed-upon ilon. In August the appointment not be able to use the Mediter- Germans vastation, naturally made directly across the table from heads of the two countries: they cross-Channel concept with dis-as commander in chief was mads rancant Europe
One Beutenant general even greater progress in 1947 you." My failure to recognise him not only had the burden of taste and with considerable mental emcial in a directive from the would stil have alrereft in South with almost every country when I entered the meeting and directing the industrial effort to reservations concerning the prac- Combined Chiefs of Staff.
and leability of ever conducting The decision to invade North of the United States Army my later personal remarks about produce the ships and guns and reporting a higher than pre-nin naturally caused a momentanks and planes and of mobilis-major invasion DO North Africa necessitated a complete re-been convinced from the begin-
ng and-dras-
ning of the war that any hope industrial output. In of embarrassment.
Europe. So, ing millions of men, but they had West Nevertheless, ing
though we versal in our thinking for
do-no- the revision in our planning and of using the Mediterranean was the United States of America i stuck to my guns and retorted, also to maintain civilian morale could not plead
Where we had been completely illusory. Even before to London he several for instance, industrial out-tatil say that the key to succuring the period of preparation thing policy while all the impedi-preparation.
commander could
Moreover, most of these delays menta of major invasion were be- counting on many months of or I went
me to resist the was two-thirds greater cess is to appoint a
accumulated, derly not be explained to the ing produced and
we now had only times urged derly build-up,
he labelled as and give him the necessary au- than in 1938, while Canada thority and responsibility to carry pubise. To do so would be to ex- we looked askance on any project weeks. Instead of a missed at- attempt, which
This pessimistic atti- The to be on that seemed
the effort to tack across narrow waters,
repudiated was well up on pre-war and out the planning and preparatory pose our own current weaknesses, that
would re
by of intensifying with the danger of most of the Latin-American work that otherwise will never
lead us to indefinite commitment
ent proposed expedition
particularly by the the gloom and despondency that in a strategy in which we did quire movement
which Insisted countries substantially great-be done."
Riven some land-based The meeting was merely for an were then so heavy, owing to the not believe. I was well aware of ocean areas where enemy sub- British ter. Elsewhere in Australia,
rapidity of the Japanese conquest, sincere British misgivings often marines would constitute a real that nothing the Union of was done. New Zealand
exchange of ideas and
Almost needless to at the misfortunes which had voted in a general way by Mr. nenace. Our target was no long-fighter of Atrica, they would South Africa wartime levels add, however, from flten on Ad-over
overtaken the British forces in
1.ut Churchill,
andera restricted front where we consi of production were maintain-miral Lord Louis Mountbatten the desert during the early sum-perideally by General Pugel
elknew accurately terrain, facilities, guarantee ed.
was my warm and firm friend.
concerning the major cross-Chan- and people as they affected mill- through the Mediterranean with-
out abnormal loss. then At the very least it was clear nel venture.
known as tory operations, but the rim of a
immediately
the decision to Yet barely 15 months ago Upon ins permanent assign-
mili- Marshall continent where no major the Chiefs of Staff that soundup.
Africa had been ment to London, there began a to the world faced a majoreries of meetings among the com-significant invasion of
Wesiem
hently agreed that, no matter fary campaign had been conduct invade North
We were not tuken, General Marshall and Ad- economic crisis. There wasmanders concern
concerned to examine Europe was possible in 1942. We what decision should be reached ed for centuries,
hot and I an acute dollar shortage, into the detalled requirements of kep: General Marshall informed by the London Conference then in to have the air power we had miral King left for Washington I remained in command af our developing
use against Europe conclusions, progress, we must secure from planned to
American forces in many countries had heavy the projected operation. Ordins of our
the British unequivocal reaffirma-and what we did have would be deficits in their international General Piget, Admiral Ramsay, munications carried by
arily these discussions involved primarily through
usted tim of the cross-Channel strategy. largely concentrated at a single,
gle, European theatre. balance of payments, imports Air Chlet Marshal Douglas, Gen-
stuif officers. In mid-July 1942, Influenced by these considera- highly vulnerable base-Gibraltar had the additional were having to be pruned to oral Spaatz, Admiral Mountbat- General Marshall and Admiral tiens, I personally favoured, at and immediate substantial suc- gnising mul the level of bare essentials ten, and myself, together with King came to London to meet that time, the third course of access would have to be achieved force into North West Africa.
A We were definitely embarked the first engagements. and some nations were in groups from our respective staffs. with the British Chiefs of Staff. lun; that is, the attempt to seize in danger of being reduced
that would engage my attention No one was in authority so no They were to discuss problems a small bridgehead on the North beachhead could be held in Nor upon the type of Allied problem
However, mandy and expanded, however riccisive arising out of realisation that a West coast of France. primitive "starvation econo- Doction could he planned very considerable period must I told General Marshall that the slowly. a beachhead on the Afri- und that of my clone associates
hazardous one and can coast might be impossible for the remainder of the war. lag strategy, tactics, organisation, elapse before a full-blooded, de- project was
my only real reason. for even to maintain. The dollar shortage still and supply were discussed inter-risive operation could be under-that
This violent Shift in torget,! To Be Continued continues but in a form not minably. These discussions were taken against the coasts of North favouring it was the fear of be- involved else- quite so acute. The wartime complicated by service and per- West Europe. They had to reckon coming so deeply
where that the major gap in the production of use-convictions regarding the usetul-
sonal prejudices and by varying with these factors.
The agreed-upon major strate Channel attack would be inde- ful goods and the post-war ness. of the air in ground opera- gical operation to be carried out
postponed, possibly even inadequacy of production in tions.
Jointly by Great Britain and the cancelled. Almost certainly
operation in the Mediter- most countries means that But through these studies and United States could not be put 1042 the dollar shortage will con-
Americans be- into effect, because of incis of ranean would eliminate the pos- major cross-Channel tinue in one form or another came more fully acquainted with forces and equipment, before late sibility of a
the
details of the strategie, 1043 at the earliest, and, since the venture in 1043. until an international trade tactical, and logistic problems in- full of the year would be a most Later developments have con- equilibrium is reached. It is, volved in an invasion of Europe unpropitious time to begin such vinced me that those who held the prospective D- the Sledgehammer operation to be [however, although still a on a decisive scale. We gained a campaign,
to all the British Intel-day, in the absence of some un- unwise at the moment were cor dominant factor, à diminish-access
The and learned the exact foreseen, radical change in the rest in their evaluation of ing problem, for even in the strength and commitments of Bri situation, might be postponed un-problem. Our limited-range could not Aghter craft of 1942 past 12 months considerable tish land, sea, and air forces. the spring of 1944, economic recovery has been Further mobilisation of British Russia was insistently demand- have provided sufficiently effec made in many of the "deficit" power, in any significant amount, ing an offensive move by Great live air cover aver the Cotentin the United States or Brittany peninsulas, against countries.
was impossible; they had already ritain and
R then the operation Much of this recovery is organised their full strength, in-during 1942, and there was a live the German air strength as
cluding women between the ages ly fear that unless such a move existed. At least, the result of individual of eighteen and nety-two.
was
undertaken the gravest con- would have been very costly. ensue on the Another reason is that out of the We learned a number of things sequences might (national efforts but in recent
North Kussian front.
West African operation months considerable stimulus that caused us to revise radically
The psychological reaction la flowed benefits to the United Na carlier general ideas of the has been added to the efforts our of the 16 European parti- operuilen. The first of these was the United States and Great Brl-Liens that were felt all through the British Air Force was tain and in all the occupied coun- the war and materially helped to be little achieve the great victory when cipating countries by the not equipped eltrer in types and trics of Europe might initiation of Marshall Aid. numbers of planes or in training short of disastrous if positive ac the invasion actually took place Those efforts while good of personnel to carry out the inton of some kind were not un-in 1044. Only meagre advantages would have followed capturo of are still not enough and the tensive preparatory work by air dertaken during 1942. International Monetary Fund
war
put
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