INCIDENT: H.K. MERCHANTS & B.E.I. co.
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on the E.L.C.'s China trade. These documents he read in the India Office Library in London, in the early 1920s, at a time when there was no such thing as xeroxing or microfilming. Morse, therefore, had to read through this enormous mass of documents in the different original handwritings, and always within the confines of the old India Office Library. Morse used his own judgment on what to quote verbatim from the documents, and how much space, if any, to allot to each episode or problem. Often he simply made a brief summary in his own words. Thus what we read is Morse's version of the gist of the E.I.C. records. But this is a personal view, and whenever possible, it is useful to be able to compare his account of an incident with that of another eye witness. This is the justification for printing Lindsay's account in this article, and comparing it with the half page précis given by Morse.
Before beginning, however, it is necessary to sketch in the background to this incident. Lindsay states vaguely that "the Hong merchants had some pecuniary demands which the supercargoes thought it their duty to resist...." Morse devotes nine pages to the relations between the Hong merchants and the supercargoes in Canton, and to explaining the bankruptcy of two Hong merchants and the measures being taken by the other merchants, and also the senior Chinese officials in Canton, to get the E.I.C.'s representatives to pay their debts. This imbroglio was confused still further by the murder of a Chinese man in January 1810. Suspicion pointed to one or more seamen serving on the E.I.C.'s ships, but no positive proof was forthcoming so no one was arrested. According to Chinese legal principles someone must be arrested and punished in the case of a homicide, even if the guilt of the arrested man was only circumstantial. The magistrate in whose jurisdiction in Canton the E.I.C. supercargoes lived began to exhort them, in December 1810, to produce the culprit(s), and threatened that failure to comply would result in a stoppage of trade. This was a familiar threat which the supercargoes themselves were quite adept at using under the right circumstances since neither they, nor the Chinese officials, really wanted trade to stop; it was mutually lucrative. On the 23rd January, 1811 the Viceroy (Governor-general of Kwangtung-Kwangsi) left his post on transfer, and the Governor of Kwangtung and the Hoppo (Superintendent of Maritime Customs for Kwangtung) were left in charge.