Al
THE CHINA MAIL, MARCH 27, 1941.
CHINA MAIL
WINDSOR HOUSE
FRENCH CONVOYS
The passage of convoy- ed French ships through the Straits of Gibraltar is relatively unimportant.
It is when they seek to re- turn that the test will come. Plainly, this is the first tentative implemen- tation of the Darlan statement: "I will let nothing stand in the way of the French peo- ple's eating," when he warned that the French fleet would be used to con- voy ships past the British blockade.
They were brave words, but, unfortunately for the admiral, they had a hol- low ring. As recently as February 12, in Paris, "a reliably informed indivi- dual who formerly held an important position in the Vichy government"- Pierre Laval, in all pro- bability--gave the show
away to the United Press. "He said that Vichy had been warned by Germany that it must use its co- lonies to the utmost to re- lieve shortages of food and raw materials in other words, to break the block- ade by force, if necessary. Clearly it is German pressure, and not French hunger-except in so far
that
SOMALI
POPULATION
MORAL FOR HITLER
BERBERA
[The friendly population of British Sonialiland contributed importantly to the demoralisa- tion of the Italians and the swift recapture of the Colony. events in Europe in days to come.]
It is significant for its promise of
What Is Hitler's
New
as that hunger has been purposely aggravated by the Nazi regime has inspired Darlan's cularly perplexing at this stand.
―
the "reliably informed in-
the
The field of the war looks parli-
ment.
Although it is certain that much greater proportion of
mu-
the
war potential of the Axis than of the British Empire is mobilised, events show that Italy is still in capable of evading damaging blows.
unlike
By
Plan?
A Student Of War
from its disadvantages.
Page
Hitler's 1918
Eight years ago, I watched Hit- ler, the new Reich Chancellor, receive, hour after hour, the ac- clamation of his marching Storm Troops from a spotlit window in the Wilhelmstrasse. On January 30, 1941, I heard him, 'the con- queror of half Europe, speak to the Germans and promise them | dccisive victory "this year."-
We get little news, these days, of what is happening "Inside Ger- many," and Hitler's last wish is that we should know. His speech was drafted to conceal and cur-
By Douglas Reed
tain everything we should like to know about the German mind-- and yet, between the lines, it tells alli
For both he and his Propaganda Minister, Goebbels emphatically declared that there would never be "another 1018" In Germany. Qui s'excuse, s'accuse. These two sentences betray the vital truth, that our best, ally, the memory of 1918, is busy in Germany.
In 1918, after 31⁄2 years of un. interrupted victories, the Germans suddenly found themselves defeat- ed. No German has ever forgot- ten that; those who are too young to remember have been told by their parents. The very words "Nineteen-Eighteen" are a langu. age, а menace, a verdict and a grim warning to every German, With every day that passes and does not bring Victory (as dis- tinct from victories) the thought of "1918" looms larger in the German mind, like a black thun- dercloud on the horizon.
Thus these two sentences, de- signed to banish fear and reassure, show what is happening "inside Germany" and in the German. mind.
Hitler to-day, like all his peo- ple, must hear the words "Nine- teen-Eighteen" in his nightmares. He has won even greater vic- tories than Ludendorff had won
he still by 1018-but
has not gained Victory. He knows what his people are thinking and wait- ing for, the doubt that festers at the back of their minds.
If Hitler wished to salvage the position there he would be more likely to adopt some bold strategy that would promise to revolu- tlonise the whole situation in the
That is why the other revealing Mediterranean. If he were pre-passages in his speech are those in pared to try his fortunes in the which he promised them "decisive Balkans otherwise inexplicable re- blows" this year and swore that ports from Rumania might have the German fighting forces would a meaning.
"compel a decision by hook or by crook" this year.
But
Q
The blows will fall. He must
In those
the
He
This is not to minimise the gravity of the food situation in France. Ra- tions have been cut, and warnings have been sounded with increasing
Gen. List was the commander of All the defeats of Italy are en- der"; but he is bound to recognise frequency of late. that a couraging; and they will bear the that Italy cannot be allowed to the army which operated on the Slovakian sector against Poland. crisis is at hand. But closest scrutiny without yielding fail without gravely compromis- He had in front of him the Car-strike, anyway: it is his last hope.
any different lesson. What is puz- ing it. The Berchtesgaden there can be little doubt zling is the fact that a minimum rangements are the fullest reco-pathians, and it would have seem-He indicated what the blows will be savage submarine and aerial ed that such a frontier could have in any reasonable mind satisfaction of Mussolini's aspira- cognition of this fact.
tions is demanded by Hitler's plan,
been held almost indefinitely with warfare, possibly an invasion, that this stringency was and there is as yet no suggestion
adequate troops, sufficiently equip- Italian East Africa is from its ped and correctly disposed.
few sentences of how he intends to assure it. By situation created in the first place
compelled to this time
depend the barrier gave him little trouble, whole truth about "inside Ger- it is possible he by the Germans, and some doubts whether Mussolini is colony used its central situation competence of the Polish generals that 1941 is his 1918. unless he has upon its own resources. That great and it is possible to infer the in-many" was disclosed. Hitler knows there is good ground, in wholly an asset in the "New Or- so badly that now it is suffering or the brilliance of Gen.
List. can gain. complete Victory. view of the statement of
Indeed, Even if the whole of the success cannot rise again, on January 30, so bad does its position appear to cannot be attributed to the Ger- 1942, and again swear that there be that it is wise to take the mini man, at least he must be reckoned will never be "another 1918" in dividual" to which we contemplated. Doubtless mum interpretation of Levents, a very able soldier; and unless he Germany, that 1942 will bring
since the Italian commander, has is meant for active operations Hitler, have referred, for believ- Petain,
"decisive victory." By that time considerable resource at his dis-there appears to be no reason for the thought and fear of "1918" ing that the stringency sincerely hopes that Dar-posal. But, however, we minimise his presence in the Balkans. will be too heavy in the hearts of
the Germans. has been deliberately in- lan's threat may bring them, recent movements are un-
questionably significant.
For the rest, the Balkans "offer
He must win, by October, or tensified recently to force about a relaxation in the blockade without requir-
attractive stategic possibilities. disappear very soon afterwards, Vichy into
action
It is the situation in Albania The movements there may be and he "carmor-win. which it threatens to inga suicidal fight on the that is most humiliating to Italy mere Teints; but they have an um
and as a consequence to Germany usually realistic (appearance and take.
part of the French Navy.
there is an The Italian Command is tagain bahind them..
inherent probability in urgent need of help from Ber-
Min. That Vichy is anxious to The consequences of being reorganised; but, so far the assume the role that Hit- open war between France grave of Italian reputations. Rein-intable: at present, but it seems to the war has been, in the larger Greek campaign has proved the Further confecture is unpro The whole of her contribution ler would have it play and Great Britain, even forcement should be easy in suite certain that if Germany has taken sense atragle series of mistakes. seems very unlikely. The over the question of the Greck naval units; but the ground the will be inclined, by every lar mistake the end of the war of the interference of British and over the bankrupt business of Italy i Hiler would only make a simi- shattered French fleet blockade, might prove at present does not lend itself to military instinct to follow some would be seen in a more imme. would be forced to per- disastrous for Betain's the deployment of great grass. It bold plan which will promise date context,
is the more primitive, soldierly milff and etriking results. The form a task that the Ger-government. Neverthe-virtues that condition the tide of attempt to prop up the shaky But is it certain he has not mans and Italians have less, Hitler has succeeded battle. consistently refused in extorting from Vichy If the Italians have shown up appeal to her, though even a Bal- In transferring the test to the fight the British Navy on a statement that implies heart is not in the war, but much ing of resistance against the is he not making the vital mis- badly it may be because their kan plan may involve the stabilis-" morale of the civilian population, the open sea. The mea-the use of French ships of the earlier lack of success was Greeks,
take that will bring, him to de sure of Marshal Petain's against the British on and tactical incompetence.
undoubtedly due to faulty training
feat? Britain is his inain objective.' What is, at least, certain is the Whatever military pattern his at- reluctance to adopt his French initiative- - thus
tendency of the East to invade the tack upon it takes, and however present stand may per- contradicting repeated In the first stages of the com-West Few can have imagined soon it may come, it will be our
paign there was evidence of a when Italy invaded Greece that morale that will be aimed at, haps be found in the fre- assurances that they plan; but when Soddu took com- the repercussions would travel as quent predictions from would never be so used. mand and a column was at the the war Italy was regarded as a in the battle of France, it was far as Berlin. When she entered -Even in Belgium, and still more: Paris in recent weeks that To this extent Darlan's very gate of Thessaly he appare reluforcement and not as the defeat of clullian morala. convoys would be employ- announcement is a digently did not know how to press liability. If she had confined her which In the end wrecked the last it through. The sole excellence of self to the African theatre she chances of a military stand. Bri- ed, and the no less fre-turbing revelation Of a the Italian soldier that has ap- might not have accomplished toin is made of less responsive quent denials from Vichy new tendency in the Ad-peared so far is his ability to hold much, as she has given no sign of material, and when Hitler makes 'an almost impossible position un- the understanding of strategy, but his attack upon her it is upon that that such a policy was miral.
der the heaviest disadvantage. at least she would not have been rock he will break.
▪fL, '
*
:
|structure of the Albanian cazn-|-committed it?
paign on the spot will sunrodly!
Laut palleca).