It must-not, however, be thought that the increased importance of technicians renders infantry. no longer necessary.
They must also be trained in the use of all the most effèctive modern weapons, such as Bren guns, Thompson guns, mortars, grenades, in anti-tank tactics, and so forth, but their function will no longer be the same as before. Frontal assaults will, we hope, be fewer or the slaughter will be ruinous.
The armoured units, with their attendant air arm will seek out the weak spot of the enemy. When the breach is made, the motorised infantry will be rushed to it in trucks, and their business will be to take possession of the captured ground and to set up a consolidat- ed defence of its flanks. They will also have to reduce, by manoeuvre and the use of their modern wea- pons, any remnants of resistance there may be.
They will keep open the tunnel through which the tanks will in- Altrate and destroy the enemy.
to
For such duties, weapon training is very necessary. It is, moreover, of great importance that as many officers and non-commissioned of- ficers as possible should be entire ly proficient in the mtricacies of map-reading. If it is cary lose one's way with a marching column, it is far easier with one moving al ter times the speed.
Trade Union Role
Training
matiers in all such calls for highly intelligent per- ception and leadership. Our cou- script army has within its ranks men with high technical experi- nee in civilian life. These men must be so placed in their units that, though they learn thoroughly the fundamentals of general sol- diering, their skill as technicians is not wasted,
There is always present
the danger that they may get caught up into the ordinary routing of army life and their skill be lost.
Though their qualifications are noted on forms when they "re- gister," forms have a habit of getting lost. Some machinery should be evolved whereby pres- sure could be put upon any com- manders by a committee from the Trade Unions, if the skill of their members was being carelessly wasted.
Major Hamish Army's is as yet not
Wilson
divisions
of
It is even possible that if the sufficiently supplied with the most modern equipment, many such men might still be of greater The spirit in which the common, fensive later on is the adminis-
value to the war-effort In civilian life. The people of Britain have withstood trative one of how to give com-
Army already has the strain and danger of ruthless mand and fuller scope to
too many "square
holes," aerial attack has aroused the ad-
pegs in round with modern minds. Suggestion is that the
Such a division would comprise due in many cases to the slavish miration of the world. Sugh
A vital step in this direction 350 armoured units. Its man- following of the "taxi-cab" sys- same military oligarchy civilian courage ments, in return, would seem to be the reorganisa-power would total about 3,500. Its tem of promotion by length that drove the Japanese the armed forces.
the highest pusable efficency intion of the armoured units into a hitting-power would be tremend-service.
separate Army of our forces. Incus. In support of this armoured into
At the present moment, care- the
Much is now said of the "culti- such an Armoured Corps it is es- force, and quagmire of
attached to it, there ful
that training, particularly vation of the offensive spirit." But sential that senior posts should be must be an Artillery group con- China is attempting to is the Army really preparing for held only by men with mechant-sisting of one
for the Armoured Corps, is of far Brigade of 25-greater importance than any long- retrieve that costly fail- the Spring in an enlightened man-cal knowledge, training and ex-pounders, one-light howitzer Bri- term attempt to raise the general ure by conquests in East,
gude, and two A.A. batteries. intellectual standards of the
At That the specialist nature of
least ten such Asia before
troops. the British raw materials and the scientists the Royal Armoured Corps is at should be created as soon as pos- The standard of efficiency of fleet is able to divert part and skilled workmen,
all officers, both commissioned Britain produced the one out-long last being recognised in high sible. of its strength from the standing invention among
the places is shown by the recent ap- The training of such armoured and non-commissioned, must be Mediterranean. Also, no weapons of land-wariare in 1814-pointment of Major-General G. Le units must, of necessity, be high-continually tested by examina
Q. Martel to its command. Noty complex. The morale of each tion. In addition, examining staffs doubt, it gambles
only is General Martel the gifted unit will depend to a more mark should themselves also be, from on Britain first organised a me-
inventor of the one-man tank; he cd degree than ever before upon time to time, changed-to prevent American commitments chanised force and began to ex-
also a
outstanding the
distinct them man of
real efficiency (as
becoming stereotyped of aid to Britain to insure periment with its use in the field.
from leadership) of its officers. outlook. strategic ability. Britain realised first the elTec -
It seems cert in that such aNew ideas must be continually quiescence in the Pacific. tiveness of supporting such me-
United Strategy But this has been from craft,
man will soon gather around him studied, practised and criticised chanised units by low-flying air-
a really efficient band of senior both in attack and defence. technical
All such training involves al- officers. These
The creation of altogether new the beginning a war of Yet it was left to the German
most limitless detail. Not only the personnel-to en- miscalculations.
mechanised divisions, with their should, by their enlightened at-ranks for
iitude to modern warfare, at last courage the initiative of crews
must mechanised experts, airmen be able to make a bold bid to- and to prevent any feeling of be-
and infantrymen, each know the wards a still higher status for the ing too much merely part of a exact part to be played by the
machine-might be considered.
others; they must also have as Royal Armoured Corps.
full a knowledge as possible of Moreover, it would be well to
the others' difficulties. whole organisation
1918 the tank.
altendant dive-bombers, to win the Battle of France. The British
is
men
Better Cooperation There is yet another problem that should at once be tackled: the vast problem of liaison.
To maintain close cooperation between units in either altack o!
The crisis in the Orient technical initiative in such mat- ters was shelved by old-fashioned is intended to synchronise minds in high military quarters. with the mounting ten-we, together with our French Al- simplify the
lies, have paid a heavy price for of the Corps, and not to continue sion in Europe. Yugo- such folly.
to cling to the old cavalry group slavia is expected to end To prepare an army for a suc¦ings. This young formation would resistance to joining the requires the use
cessful war in an Age of Petrol rank as the equal of any older- of ideas and established groups; its senior of- Axis. The fate of Bulgaria technical skill of men who have ficers would hold an equivalent defence was even in 1914-1918
ranking and its independence
of many senior officers handi- The war will be won not by in the early years heroism, but by machines intelli- capped us of the last war. We have already gently directed; not by masses of been adversely affected in this infantry, but by the breaking-up war by the "1914-1918" outlook of such masses by mechanised
grown up in such an Age.
The "Bocr War" mentality would be guaranteed.
be broken.
in..
}
In high places, the three major sections of the land forces--the Infantry, the Army Air Command, and the Armoured Corps-must each have an equal right to ex- press an opinion upon strategy.
groups
The role of tanks must be pro- -a complicated problem.
perly assessed. They are not a is sealed. Apparently de-
mere adjunct to the infantry-so To do so to-day is certainly no serted by Russia another
less difficult. The enemy in France units. They are the picked fight- many tanks to so many infantry completely upset the British and ing force of the future. "reluctant" little neutral
French liaison system. Units be- is to be either passageway
came detached and scarcely knew They must be used in masseð for Hitler's war or itself a
where they were
of their own, free frorn or where the the demands of the infantry; small of many senior officers in the War units with aerial support. battleground.
enemy were either. This must on groupings of them will generally Office and in the regimental.com-
no account be allowed to happen lead mands. The control of the vigor-
to severe Icases. Whether We Need More Tanks again, Either a many-pronged ous imaginative ideas of the
they are held in reserve as an younger men: by the outworn, set
In the fast-moving warfare of overwhelming fire-unit in a de- attack is planned in the ideas of men who are senior by
The number of Armoured Divi-to-day, a matter of essential im-cisive counter-attuck, or whether Balkans, the Mediter-virtue of length of service must sions, and the composition of each portance is the proper use of wire. they are carefully prepared for
such division, will be a matter for less telegraphy. The enemy, has offensive (as distinct from coun ranean and the China It is wanton waste to await careful, unprejudiced decision by shown himself far ahead of us inter-offensive) action must be de Sea, accompanied by an the test of action before the ad- the High Command.
his grasp of the possibilities of cided upon by the High Command justment of true merit is attempt- It is certain that we had too rudio in wari This has not; bech | strategists: -- intense campaign to cut ca.. A man accustomed to plan in few tanks in comparison with merely in the subtle tricks of pro- The opinion of tank experts off American supplies to terms of lifantry moving at three the enemy in France, It is also pagunda, but also in this very must, however, be listened
miles per hour will find the speed certain that, to be really effective, matter of liaison between air, in- without prejudice. Just as tank Britain, or the world is of modern mechanised warfare a our policy must be bold.
fantry and tank units.
tactics are being improved, so is being misled by more false serious problem.
At the outset, of: the war -our There is no need slavishly to it reasonable to assume that anti- alarms. Such alarms may found more easily by men brought
tank methods are also developing be the climax to the up as youth in the modern age,
A bold and imaginative concep.. flon of the whole problem is an strategy of terror, but the with their more mechanical turn
of mind.
essential of land victory. It is the very necessities of the
co-ordination of all such matters 'dictators' make it unlike-
by the High: Command that must: knit the modern army into an ly.
'intelligent, democratic whole, t
in are power; there was an uns great need for improving upon due preponderance of ligh::reconsour own employment of so potent noissance tanks. A much stronger a weapon. Division would be one consisting Here again, la yet another op- of: about 100 heavy tanks, 150 portunity for the specialist techni- A: Now Partner
medium tanks, and:100 light:tanks; | cian, The most careful `training A key problem, then, of how together with 10 ɛmbke tanks for of such men, ought, to be under- best to trûin our army"for an afe 1.purposes, of: camoufingeg
taken at once.
fast The solution is bound to be mobile divisions were too light follow his example, but there is
16 E
to