THE CHINA MAIL, OCTOBER 1, 1940.
CHINA MAIL
WINDSOR HOUSE
IRRESISTIBLE?
The alliance between Tokyo and the Axis, fac- tually, changes little. What was understood is now openly professed.
It will do Britain more good than harm, however, if, as is likely, its effect is to bring home to Ameri- cans how close they are to actual conflict, how cir- cumstances are compell- ing them to a decision, or at least to a long-range defence policy which will involve stinting themsel- ves in order that Britain be maintained in the fore- front
in overwhelming strength.
If world conditions were such that a nation could keep out of war simply by not being disposed to go to war, these argu- ments would have some force. But Europe has seen oné nation after another overrun whose deepest de- sire was to be left in peace. Even isolationists general- ly accept the thesis that the only way for America safely to assume it will not have to go to war is to
RAP
7597-1598-1599-1600
(Copyright in All Countries.)
Four Military Tasks
be prepared for it if it. Four military tasks confront mean \\(a)
comes.
the establishment of the full nature of the problem | As for the first of these ques- this country in its present situa- two or more bridgeheads and (b) will be apparent. In marine gun- tions the difficulties in the enemy' tion: (1) Repelling (or, better still, destroying) effective invasion; (2) the maintenance of permanentnery alone the defence outclasses way appear on inspection to be as the offensive by sea, and on the formidable here as in any other On this premise, how-Imposing blockade on the enemy; communications oversea between one side you have a professional department. The great extent of ever,
the three conten-(3) Raising the enemy's counter-those-bridgeheads and the enemy's personnel formed by years of long our own coastline and the great a short-number.of available ports, coupled blockade; (4) Ultimately taking sources of supply in men and training, on the other tions of the die-hard iso-offensive. This last point is com- munitionment from the continent. service conscript personnel. The with the obvious fact that the de- fence possesses interior lines, are lationists boil down to monly understated or omitted; its As to (a), it is by no means an difference is not to be neglected.
necessity will be explained when impossible task, beginning on a The maintenance of permanent the conditions adverse to a coun- strange and grim concluwe reach it.
reduced scale and increasing after communications therefore is the ter-blockade of this island by the sions. Thus:
These four acts are neither con- the bridgeheads were established. kernel of the invasion business enemy. It has not as yet been.
and from the point of view of the really attempted. The main arm To hold that one should secutive nor indissoluble. The first More than one bridgehead
three might come into play simul preferably widely separated enemy, and is by far the heaviest against it (which is defence from.
are. a condition of of his tasks, perhaps beyond pow- the air) works at the shortest pos- not begin to fight until taneously or only two of them bridgeheads
sible ranges and from bases which Their connection is not such invasion, because an Isolated er-of-accomplishment.--
of his country is invaded is, might.
nccessary or indissoluble either bridgehead would invite Imme- It may be argued that invasion are, like every other form in effect, to prefer that because one of them, invasion, is diate and overwhelming naval being now possible not only, by island defence, upon interior lines. war should be fought on a separate proposition from the and military concentration against sea but by air, such arguments as
Therefore these are obsolete. That is indeed The Final Decision rest, while the last one, the coun- its small beginnings. American soil, destroying ter-offensive, takes on its full feint and diversion are necessary the contention of those who, on
other to the invader,
the enemy side, have been ntos 4. Counteroffensive. American homes, giving
hopeful of success. But the use fourth point we have called the hostages of American re- complete failure in any one of Problem Never Solved of the air for invasion must con- most essential. It is the point of sider the oxcellence of the an ⚫ ultimate counter-offensive sources rather than that these acts would mean defeat ac-
cording to the degree of that Such bridgeheads, we say,, are numerically inferior air force on against the enemy. In all human its tide should be met and failure, while fallure in the first, conceivable enough. The military the side of the defence. This su conflict there can be but two the repelling of the effective. in- opposition to 'them from within periority in quality is, as we have forms of conclusive action.. One is. turned back before it rea-vasion, would mean defeat of all might well be at first, insuficient constantly poirited out, increasing, the offensive, carried on from 'ches United States shores. the rest. Upon the carrying out and the naval threat against them Wherever the enemy has hitherto start to finish till a decision is Those who oppose fur- of these acts, and especially the from without would at first be struck with full success he has reached; the other is the defen-
last, the counter-offensive, 'de-
met with no adequate resistance sive, and the defensive can have nishing assistance to Brit-pends the survival of this country
in this arm; here he would meet only one object which is the gain- with high resistance.
ing of time in which to develop ain may reasonably be in the national position it has held
the opportunities for an offensive asked, "Do you mean you
later on. A permanent defensive is inconceivable as a method. It would rather wait until
is a contradiction in terms. The
at
three are value only when all the
accounted for. But
for generations.
Invaders' Task
of final to
By HILAIRE BELLOC
Air Blockade
2.-Imposing blockade. Sup-
The
our
the lives of American sai-1-Repelling affective invasion. lors instead of British sai-Only affective invasion is to be scattered, awaiting concentration, posing invasion on sufficient scale most powerful defensive systems considered, ie, massive invasion It is rather the second condition, be not attempted, the defensive in history (of which perhaps the lors shall be risked in on a scale permitung full in the maintenance of permanent would rely upon the traditional crusading Syrian castles were for
between com-communications
the power of blockade and the offen- their period the best examples) for defence have never served enemy action
ultimate operating destroyers, and permanent occupation and
only but always for pelling the destruction or capitu- bridgeheads and the continent, sive (that is the
counter-offensive. Lacking the do you prefer that thelation of the defence. If such in- which presents the most formid- against us) upon the novel ex- No doubt the periment of counter-blockade, the
success of this last, a defensive vasion succeeds it succeeds alto-able difficulties. American Army and Navy vashon suo partial success is pos-enemy has built and concentrated closing. of our ports by enemy system has always failed and should have to fight-possible, that is, no partial success transport and has added also by action from the air.
the new building to his striking pow- The enemy has rightly insisted must fall
Now, what, are the opportunities sibly Japan and Germany could be fause whatever suffer by sea: No doubt along com- upon the much greater difficulty
once without an ally cient body of resistance remained paratively short and narrow lanes which our effort at blockading him for the counter-offensive on in the world rather than would in the nature of things. be great superiority in the air might will suffer from the extension of side in the present struggle? The the approaches to be watched. moral factors are numerous, the increasingly reinforced by the guarantee transport temporarily. with one?"
́defence 'with its much greater re- But temporary transport would Until lately it sufficed to watch chief among them being the gen- Transport would the issues of the North Sea and eral opinion of the civilised world sources and world-wide. connec be worthless. Finally, those who pleations (supposing, of course, that have to be permanent and on a the Channel.' It Is 'now 'necessary and the growing reaction of those to save American youth from conscription and interrupted). If effective invasion true even of the supplies required tic coast and, of course, the entries on a large scale and occupying for the personnel, and when we to the Mediterranean, which in training in peacetime for the invaded territory fully is suc- add to this the very great difcul- cluded the entry of the Red Sea, imposed defence are advocating a cessful nothing could oust it or tiles of conveying and landing the Nor can blockade be
destroy it, save a fully equipped heavy material, tanks and artil- even with a wholly superior navai complacent course that and fully organised army on the lery and munitionment, which the power, on supplies across the may result in these young same scale at least as the invad- effort would require, it should be Near East and the Black Sea.
manifest that the establishment On all these accounts the enemy long as invasion is repelled but men being sent into bat-| Now the conditions of effective of permanent communications. by has affirmed the impossibility of continually increases in value. It tle as the most helpless Invasion on such a scale are sim- the enemy between his bases and the
ple and known to everybody: they kind of "cannon fodder". untrained troops-instead
er's own forces.
his invading forces would present a problem never yet solved and perhaps insoluble.
The Kernel When we consider that the main to any such action is still
Imponderable, occupied, and massacred. But neglecting this. which cannot be measured or de- sively discussed, there is one ma- jor opportunity for counter-offen- sive from our side. That oppor- tunity not only remains intact so
old-fashioned .blockade is, the use of the air arm. against him being established un- The knowledge of this makes der present conditions. It is to be the enemy' subject to the condi- remarked that neutral opinion, so tions of a comparatively short far as it can be gauged by the war. He may, for purposes of neutral Press, inclines. to the ruse, talk otherwise, but he knowa :/ enemy's thesis here; but only ex-well enough that unless he can perience can decido,
occupy the base from which he 3-Raising the counter-block. will be attacked, which base is
of skilled in how to pro- ing to think in humane tect themselves.
and sympathetic terms. The people who take Yet is this true solicitude obstueet, which in mere numbers ade. Can the enemy establish a this island, the ultimate increas these positions are for the for American youth and remains overwhelmingly superior counter-blockade and, if so, could ing superiority of the air arm, not most part keenly con- civilised behaviour in the to anything the enemy can have the defence raise it when it was only in quality but in quantity, provided, and in trained personnel established or in course of establ-involve a decision against
him. scientious. They are try-world?
is still more strikingly superior, | lishment?