THE CHINA MAIL, MAY 4, 1937.
Atlantic
And
Pacific
Navies In 1937
A Battle Fleet To Complete Singapore?
MANY naval officers concur in any case, if her claim is rejected to the British Navy in combatant able. Her geographical position is
;
the view that if we were at she will assuredly seek by hook or power by 1942, the year in which almost ideal for a war with any war with a major Mediterranean crook to acquire other territories the shipbuilding Power it would be impossible to overseas, so that her reappearance signed to
programme dé- Western Power other than Russia. achieve "parity" is due Thanks to a complete safeguard our merchant shipping as an oceanic Power is probably to mature.
system of Yet, as new vessels are naval bases both in Japan proper in the Far East. Remembering only a question of time. When completed and commissioned they and in outlying islands she could the frightful losses suffered there that happens, will she remain con- are, with rare exceptions, promptly concentrate practically her entire during the Great War-about 40 tent with the 35: 100 ratio of naval sent to the Pacific, where per cent. of the total casualties to strength prescribed by the Anglo- eighths of the entire navy is now of Tartary and Formosa.
seven- fleet at any point between the Gulf British, allied an neutral shipping German treaty?
On the Without in any concentrated. The United States, other hand, the absence of friendly occurred in the Mediterranean way aspersing the good faith of in short, is not in the least worried bases would prevent a hostile fleet they strongly urge the immediate Germany's rulers, it is conceivable about its Atlantic frontier, a fact from deploying more than a portion closure of the Mediterranean to that they may eventually find this from which the logical conclusion of its strength commercial traffic at the first threat ratio inadequate for the security of will readily be drawn.
in the Western Pacific. of war and the rerouteing of
Apparently, all the Fatherland, its foreign posses-
therefore, We turn now to the Pacific, Japan's strategic Eastern shipping via the Cape. This sions and its seaborne trade. Sheer where the naval outlook from our pregnable, a probability that
position is i would at once relieve the Navy of force of circumstance may, in fact, point of view is far from satisfac- dows her navy with a a task which, if attempted, would compel them to reconsider the tory. Public interest has just been strength incalculably greater than impose a fearful strain on its de- pledge contained in the agreement attracted to that quarter by the is indicated by its aggregate ton- pleted resources, and enable it to that the 35: 100 ratio is to be "a combined exercises held at Singa- nage.
By Hector C. Bywater
im-
en-
relative
She would, of course, forfeit this advantage if she embarked on a campaign at any considerable dis- tance from her home waters, a fact so obvious that it seems to exclude the possibility of her launching out on an overseas "adventure" against Australia or other remote territory.
concentrate instead on purely mil- itary operations. When consider- ing this question. it is important to remember that the ordinary methods of convoy by destroyers, sloops and armed liners would be futile in the Mediterranean, where
convoys would be liable to attack by the most powerful battleships and crui- sers, not to mention aircraft. Con- sequently, nothing short of a com-
permanent relationship, never to be pore to test the strength of the de- A Strategic Bridge-- plete battle fleet would be needed
́fences guarding the new naval base. to escort merchant shipping on the Thanks to our consistently good This immense undertaking is due route between the Suez Canal and relations with the United States, for completion in 1939. Including which fronts the Sea of Japan. Only the naval position in the Western the fortifications, the whole scheme
Gibraltar.
..are
exceeded.
on
Her one vulnerable flank is that
a few hundred miles to the west-
the
to
of
with
Atlantic gives rise to no anxiety, will have cost at least £16,000,000. ward lies Vladivostok, where Rus- The Eastern Atlantic
The equanimity with which British Considering the great strategic im- « sia has massed a great fleet of air opinion views the remarkable ex- portance of Singapore the provision bombers and a force of submarines pansion of American naval power
of a first class fleet base was essen- variously estimated at from 50 Turning to the Eastern Atlantic, in recent years is in no way due to tial. At the same time the magni 70 units. Russia, in fact, is the Germany's naval rearmament and sentimental reasons.
It rests
tude of the scale on which the Sele- only Power which is capable o her demand for the restoration of the knowledge not only that cir- tar base has been designed is rather directly menacing Japan's coastline her former colonies are inevitably cumstances in which the two coun- bewildering. It appear to indicate and her vital communications w reacting on the strategic outlook tries could become enemies are well an intention of making Singapore Manchuria and Korea. But a fur- As suggested in a previous article, nigh inconceivable,
at some future date the headquar- ther source of anxiety to Tokio is but that the impressive and, if Soviet claims strong American navy is one of the ters of a very powerful battle fleet,
well founded, sensational surest bulwarks of peace in the for there is docking accommodation United States of a strategic bridge prospective creation by the growth of Russian sea-power will Pacific, and in less degree in
for no fewer than three of the larg- across the Pacific. With the overt compel Germany to keep a con- Atlantic as well. siderable force in the Baltic. But London and Washington were wont
The days when est capital ships.
support of the U.S. naval authori as the Kiel Canai
ties Pan-American Airways have gives her the to squabble over relative strengths Co-ordinated Defence means of swiftly and secretly mov at sea are gone for ever, it is to
already established a series of air ing her ships from North Sea to be hoped and believed.
bases between San Francisco and Baltic, and vice-versa, she might ac-{
There is some reason to hope that the Philippines, the intermediate Though in some respects the two a sounder scheme of co-ordinated points being Midway Island, Wake cept the risk of leaving the Baltic nations are very dissimilar, their defence will emerge from the Im Island and Guam. It is possible, only lightly guarded for a brief political objectives are in broad out- perial Conference. No one in this therefore, that Japan's strategic period in order to effect a big con- line almost identical. Neither has country presumes to lecture the control of the Western Pacific may centration in the North Sea for a designs on foreign territory, and Dominions on their shortcomings in be appreciably weakened in the decisive blow. She did, in fact, both regard
the maintenance of respect of self-defensive measures, near future. Meanwhile she
claiza for the return
press the
the
has
23
take an equivalent risk in Septem- peace as the supreme objective. It but it is pretty obvious that Great adopted a new naval programme de- ber, 1917, when her two best dread- is worthy of remark that Anglo- Britain cannot continue indefinitely signed to maintain her relative nought squadrons were brought in- American relations have steadily im- to bear, as she is now bearing, al- strength vis-a-vis the American and to the Baltic to share in the opera proved since the somewhat artificial most the entire burden of Imperial British fleets, and is spending tion against the Russian islands off catchwords of "hands across the defence. As the First Lord of the per cent of her total budget the Gulf of Riga.
sea" and "blood is thicker than Admiralty hinted recently,-- the naval armaments alone. that Germany means to pres
There appears to be little doubt water" gave place to a realisation policy under which certain Domin- Whatever political developments of far more substantial grounds for ions maintain small local squadrons in the Pacific the future may hold ies. On the question as to whether this connection & highly significant have added that the organisation of rely chiefly on its own resources for colon- understanding and co-operation. In is strategically unsound. He might in store, the British Empire must this claim should be sympatheti- fact, apparently unnoticed in cally considered British opinion is country, but freely commented upon
this a Pacific Fleet, comprising EN. and the defence of its local interests. At
Dominion ships, under a single com-
time those resources demonstrably insufficient. The sure of security than the mainten completion of the Singapore base ance of "pocket fleets," isolated one will be a step in the right direction, from the other, and liable to be but since a fortress "commands" destroyed out of hand because in- nothing beyond the range of its capable of serious resistance. I guns the new base will add little to
Over a large area of the Western our strength those bases proved of negligible Navy grows in stature, and there Pacific Japan exercises a strategic we have
the Pacific unless value to her in the last war. In is little doubt that it will be equal control that seems to be unimpeach make use of it.
available a battle fleet to
sharply divided. Much publicity is elsewhere, is the present distribu. mand would give a far greater meaesent
given to the argument that the re- tion of the American naval forces. trocession of her former territories
in South-West and East Africa m
would provide Germany with bases Towards The Pacific
for potential commerce raiders, though it must be admitted that
Year by year the United States
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