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I have dealt with this subject at some length because there appears to be a certain divergence of opinion on it at present: and whether my contentions be considered correct or not, it is of great importance to have this point clearly defined in the minds of all concerned with the prevention of piracy.
4. Regulations. To go into the Report in detail, the paragraph dealing with the Regulations starts by strongly urging "that it is the province of the Navy to protect commerce... ..against the depredations of pirates.
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The Royal Navy amongst other duties has of course the responsibility for taking all steps reasonably possible to suppress piracy.
Against external piracy a great, deal can be, and has been done by the Patrol system now in force in the Delta. External piracy of a sea-going ship is so improbable as to require no further remarks.
5. Against internal piracy, in my opinon, the Royal Navy can do but little. It is purely a question of internal organisation in each particular merchant ship, and I would lay it down as a broad principle that, in existing circumstances internal piracy can only be countered by internal measures.
6. The only measures that occur to me which the Royal Navy could take to render this form of attack less attractive, are:
(a) Exterminate known pirate strong holds.
(b) Patrol off seaward approaches thereto.
7. With regard to (a) this involves political considerations, and though un- doubtedly the most effective of all methods of dealing with the trouble, at the present time it would seem to present peculiar difficulties*. I shall have some remarks to make on (b) in connection with the Report's section concerning patrols.
8. The remainder of the section of the "Minority" Report under consideration, ("Regulations") devotes itself to proving the uselessness of the present Regulations. En passant it is worth noting, that the finding of the "Sui An" Piracy Commission quoted, "the bridge could only have been held for a sufficient time to have robbed the attack of its element of surprise, it is probable that the bridge could not have been finally held......" has not been borne out either by the expert evidence which has been heard by the "Sunning" Commission or by the actual events which occurred on board the s.s. "Sunning".
9. The conclusion to which the Report comes on the subject of the Regulations is that "if it is necessary to retain certain of them until Naval Patrols (hereinafter mentioned) are provided,.....they should be considerably modified, and all that is required is that the bridge and engine room and stokehold entrances should be protected and the officers armed".
10. From this I infer that the authors of the Report would have no objection to the total abolition of the Regulations, and with this I very much agree. By enacting regulations, (some of them of dubious legality), the Government has tacitly assumed a certain share of a responsibility, which is in nowise theirs. In any case,
In any case, it is clearly impossible for the Government to lay down a completely different set of regulations for every individual ship that plies the China Seas, though a kind of attempt is made to do this by means of the "Scheme of Defence". But that is what would be required in order to get the maximum value out of the various measures in use or suggested. Careful con- sideration must be given to the peculiarities of individual ships, their officers, crews, the run on which they are employed and, in short a variety of details. What might be a very efficient and adequate set of precautions to adopt in one ship or even in one part of the same ship might well be inappropriate, vexatious and even dangerous in another.
*Since the above was written operations of this nature were carried out against certain villages in Bias Bay
on 23rd March, 1927: