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I am of opinion that there was in this case a compulsory ejectment from the property under its then conditions, the property being thenceforward held under altered conditions. There is in this a sufficient analogy to the ordinary case of compulsory ejectment from land, to warrant the usual 10% being added. But this percentage should be calculated only on the subject matter of the compensa- tion, that is, on the altered value of the property: in other words, on the difference in value of the property as a Marine and as an Inland Lot.
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Question 6. Should the damage, if any, done to the claimants' business by alterations to the sea bottom, if any, which may have resulted from the Praya Re- clamation Works, before these were carried in 1898 in front of the claimants' Lot, be considered an injury sustained by a lessee, as defined at the commencement of Section 8 of the Ordinance, for which compensation may be awarded under Section 8 (6), or as an injurious affecting of the property of a Marine Lot holder, against. which claims are barred by Section 9 ?
Answer. The answer to this question depends on the proper construction of Art. 8 (6) of Ordinance No. 6 of 1889.
This Article provides that a lessee who does not signify his acceptance of the conditions laid down by the Ordinance "shall have no claim to any compensation in respect of any depreciation of his Lot by reason of the works". but that the Governor may, if he thinks fit, award him such a sum of money as he may in his absolute discretion think sufficient "as and by way of compensation for any injury that such lessee may have sustained by the works."
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The use of the words "compensation for depreciation" in the first part of the sentence. and of the words "compensation for any injury
in the second part, raises a question of considerable difficulty.
I do
The contention on the part of the Crown was that compensation for depre- ciation in value was absolutely taken away by the first part of the sentence. not think this can be so. For, by the latter part of the Article, the Governor in exercising his discretion as to awarding compensation, is to award such compensation for any injury". Injury" in the ordinary use of the word, includes both "depreciation in value" and consequential injury, such as loss of business directly resulting from the works. If the contention of the Crown were to be accepted, then the compensation to be given by the Governor would be for consequential injury only. I do not agree that this is the true construction of the clause. I am of opinion that the use of the word "injury" in the second part, as distinguished from "depreciation" in the first part, indicates that both forms of injury were to be taken into account, and compensation given both for depreciation in value and for consequential injury. What was taken away was not compensation for depreciation, but the claim" to such compensation: the assessment of the compensation being left to the absolute discretion of the Govern-
ог.
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The effect of the clause appears therefore to be this: that the general prin- ciples of compensation for disturbance of private rights for the public benefit are to apply, with the sole difference that the assessment of the compensation is put within the Governor's discretion. It is not for me to enquire why this was done but a reason may be suggested. The work was undertaken by the Government for the benefit of a few lot-holders; and the sum which the Government would have in hand for compensation purposes would be limited to the price realised by the sale of the reclamation in front of the refusing lessee's Lot. It may have been considered advisable to limit compensation to this sum: a principle which had in fact been adopted on a previous occasion. It remains to consider the effect of Art. 9 of the Ordinance. This Article excludes compensation "for depreciation or in- jurious affecting of the property from all persons except as in the Ordinance provided. The lessee who does not signify his acceptance is provided for in the Ordinance. The Article applies therefore to damages alleged to have been suffered by other parties, but not by the claimants. I may however point to the use of the words "depreciation or injurious affecting "; the reference to both forms of injury seems to corroborate the view I take as to the meaning of the clause of Art. 8 already considered.
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