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Petition is dated 22nd May, 1903, and in paragraph 4 thereof [reads from Peti- tion.] When the Petitioner inserted that statement, he evidently had in his mind what we would call at law an "easement", that is to say he thought he had an easement to the Praya Front, or in other wonds, a privilege pertaining to himself as the holder of the Marine Lot, to the exclusive use, I take it, of the Praya and the approaches thereto, whereas, Messrs. Howard and Stephens had no right whatever to the exclusive use of or access to the sea, but they had the usual right, which all the public have, namely, to use the Praya for the purpose of access to and from the Sea. Now, such an easement as they claim can only be acquired in two ways, that is to say, it must either be expressly stipulated in the Crown Leuses or implied from the fact of the sea being a boundary to their land. If you look at the Lease itself, you will find there is not granted a right of any kind whatsoever to use the Praya to land cargo. There is no express right given to Messrs. Howard and Stephens over anybody else, nor could they at any time have prevented me or anybody else from landing goods immediately opposite their Godowns, unless they had a Wharf under license from the Crown, but they had no claim on the fore- shore, nor had they any right or interest whatever, apart from the general public right. There is no express grant of an easement, and you can never have an easement except by express grant, or by a riparian right, which carries with it the absolute right to the use of the sea. There is nothing of the kind in the docu- ment, and if you will look at the thirteenth line from the bottom of that counter- part Lease, you will find that the boundary of the Leasehold is the Praya. Under the Crown Grant, he has no rights to the other side of the Praya, but, I concede, that he had in common with all Her Majesty's subjects the use of the Praya, but he had no right of access by which he could claim compensation any more than any other person in Hongkong; it is a common general right. I say, therefore, that this evidence as to silting up of the property of the King's foreshore, the King's highway, in front of Mr. Stephens' land, is absolutely irrelevant for the purpose of the Inquiry here to-day, because no one can get damages for the depri- vation of supposed rights. They must be actual rights. Now this misconception is shared in by the Complainants aud those who support them; I say that their evidence speaks of the Plaintiffs' sea, and refers to the foreshore as their foreshore. All the foreshore, unless it be taken out of the power of the Crown, belongs to the Crown [reads from Section 7 of the Ordinance, Revised Edition.] I submit that this Section certainly vested the foreshore in the Crown. This Section goes on to say [reads from Ordinance.] Seventeen years after that Ordinance was passed, we cannot take the evidence of Mr. Stephens as to silting up. These rights are absolutely extinguished. He is offering you the evidence of something which occurred to this property in 1895 or 1896, whereas an Ordinance was pas- sed 7 years before, which said he had no right. That clause distinctly declares. that no claim to any compensation in respect of depreciation by reason of this work shall be entertained. The whole claim to the foreshore is absolutely imagi nary. If the Government are to compensate the Lot-holders by reason of loss of access to the sea, they would strictly have to compensate everybody whether he is a front Lot-holder or not. The case of the Marine Lot Holder in Hongkong under the Leasehold, is not the same as the case of the Marine Lot Holder in Singapore. There it was held that a Lot folder had absolute right of access to the sea, because his boundary was the sea.
HIS EXCELLENCY:-If there were no rights, why should the Governor give compensation? The Claimants say that their property was depreciated by reason
of the silt.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL:--As the Government is a paternal Government, and it does not like anyone to be hurt, it puts this clause in. Still, you may give a solatium; you may give what you think in your absolute discretion is reasonable; that which a Judge could not give. Clause 9 is explained by C. J. Carrington in his Judgment-[reads from C. J. Carrington's Judgment, at bottom of page 20.] In Carrington's Judgment, Your Lordship, these words appear-[reads from Judgment again.] Mr. Francis argued that there must have been power to give compensation for depreciation, or this language would not have been used- [reads from C. J. Carrington's Judgment, p. 21. ]
I wish here to call your attention to the opening words of Section 9 [reads from Section 9 of the Ordinance.] That shews that nobody is entitled to compensation for depreciation. The injury referred to in Sub-section 6 of Section 7 must mean loss other than by