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There is no express power to appoint a judge to relieve from or in his judicial duties a judge who may be engaged at the time in other public work, or to appoint an additional judge for the purpose of deal- ing with a pressure of judicial work. The chief object of this bill is to give the Governor power to appoint a temporary judge in any case in which he considers it desirable for any reason. This is effected by clause 4
of this bill.
2. Sub-section (2) of section 9 of the principal Ordinance provides that, save as is provided in section 5 (3) of the Full Court Ordinance, 1912”, every judge shall be appointed by Letters Patent under the public seal of the Governor, in accordance with such instructions as he may receive through a Secretary of State. Sub-section (3) of the same section pro- vides, subject to the same saving, that the judges shall hold office during His Majesty's pleasure. The obvious intention of the two savings is that a person appointed temporarily to sit as judge in the Fall Court (a) need not be appointed in the formal manner in which per- manent judges are appointed, and (b) shall cease to hold office when the necessity for his appointment ceases. Clause 2 of this bill extends these two exemp- tions to all temporary judges. The wording of the saving is slightly altered because neither of the sections referred to in it makes any express provision for either exemption.
3. Clause 2 of the bill deals with a matter which has long been awaiting a convenient opportunity. Section 6 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1873, provides in effect "so much of the practice of the English Courts as existed on the 5th April, 1843, shall be in force in the Colony", except so far as the said practice may have been modified by local legislation. The former English practice had been so modified in the following branches of the law :-
(a) Civil proceedings generally, exclusive of ---
(1) matters testamentary,
(2) bankruptcy,
(3) Admiralty, and
(4) companies.
This is under the Code of Civil Procedure:
Ordinance No. 3 of 1901, s. 3.
(b) Probate jurisdiction:
1897, ss. 45, 74 and 75.
Ordinance No. 2 of
() Bankruptcy: Ordinance No. 7 of 1891. (d) Admiralty: Ordinance No. 6 of 1896.
(e) Companies: Ordinance No. 58 of 1911. (7) The practice of "the Supreme Court acting in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction": Ordinance No. 9 of 1899.
(9) Magistrates appeals: Ordinance No. 3 of
1890.
(h) Summary Court appeals: Ordinance No. 4
of 1873.
4. It would seem that all the ground of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is covered by local legislation with the exception of such Crown Office matters as are not instances of the exercise by the Supreme Court of its criminal jurisdiction. Such matters include habeas corpus, mandamus, and perhaps some writs of certiorari. The only reference to the Crown Office is in section 4 of Ordinance No. 9 of 1899, and that does not help in any way on the present point.