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(c)
2
Chinese
May expect better
cooperation and support if we accede to joint selection early. Conversely, Chinese cooperation
and support will be less than
forthcoming if we don't.
(3) Disposal/deployment of HKG financial assets
Reflects a deep-seated Chinese suspicion that somehow HKG's financial assets would be expanded unnecessarily or siphoned off to British interests before 1997.
Manifests in Chinese demands for consultation over
a whole range of issues, e.g. privatization/ corporatization, franchises, contracts straddling
1997.
They make life difficult for us on all fronts
in the JLG, in order to apply pressure on us to accept consultation on their terms, i.e. no decision (unilateral action) without Chinese agreement.
Difficulty is : closer we are to 1997, more we are unlikely to be able to make arrangements stick for
financial issues straddling 1997 without Chinese support or acquiescence. On other hand, worry about consulting the Chinese on too many issues, taking long-time, thus paralysing HKG administration.
[Maybe a degree of acceptance of Chinese influence in ExCo will help alleviate suspicion.]
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