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Electoral Arrangements for 1995
Look forward to seeing your package of detailed measures for enhancing democracy at the 1995 elections.
Strongly share your view (para 12 of telegram) that once we have set out our stall in public, we cannot be seen to retreat from it in significant ways.
That has important consequences for public handling in the initial stages:
your paper suggests that you would make the package of measures for the 1995 LegCo a main plank of your LegCo address in October; would that not (a) lead to an acrimonious exchange of public positions with the Chinese, and (b) box us further into the corner on directly-elected seats? an alternative might be to give the main emphasis in your LegCo speech to the rearrangement of the ExCo/ LegCo relationship (having forewarned the Chinese
when I see Qian in New York). You might deal much more generally with the broad principles of an approach on the 1995 elections. You could then make a virtue when you see the Chinese in Peking later in October of having avoided a public negotiation: and present them privately with the package of electoral
reforms;
likelihood of a lengthy negotiation with the Chinese. At a certain point (6-9 months?) we would have to decide that we had got as far as we could. Political judgement then needed on balance between those elements which were politically essential for us, and those which would, if included, lead the Chinese to de-rail the through train.
BOYABH/2
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