(2)
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on the Guangdong project comparable to the French - though
westinghouse have recently signed an agreement with the Chinese
to work together on the development of turbines;
This option may not prove viable because of the difficulties
of the relationship between NNC and Westinghouse. In the context
of American policy on non-proliferation the use of Westinghouse's
technology would require formal approval from the State Department,
as would any supply of components from the US. Serious problems
would be unlikely if NNC were in a position to assume full
responsibility for the nuclear island, with Westinghouse's
involvement limited to that of licensor. But NNC cannot carry
such a responsibility, particularly because it has insufficient
capitalisation to shoulder more than a very minor share of the
liabilities involved. Substantial and direct Westinghouse
. involvement could, however, raise problems with the State
Department. Thus it may be necessary to present the NNC rather
than Westinghouse as the main agency supplying PWR technology
to China. But, in practice, in their contractual relationship,
Westinghouse would have to assume the role of main contractor,
with NNC as their sub-contractor.
(3) CLP are strongly opposed to such a package and are adamant they
would not recommend it to their colleagues in the Guangdong
Power Company. Although Dr Marshall considers that one of the
Korean PWR stations built by GEC and Westinghouse could be
presented to the Chinese as a reference plant to support the
viability of this option, CLP are likely to consider it unproven,
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