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Flag A
The Case against supply: Policy
4.
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Potential damage to UK Non-Proliferation
This aspect of the proposed contract was last
considered by British Ministers on the basis of Mr Alston's sub-
mission of 25 February 1980. Paragraph 9 of that submission
referred to nonproliferation issues, which were covered at greater
length in paragraphs 8 to 13 of the note attached to
Flag B Sir Keith Joseph's letter of 18 February 1980, on which Mr Alston's
submission was commenting. Ministers agreed then that it would not be necessary to make IAEA safeguards or outside inspection a condition of supply, but that negotiations over the contract
might be used to encourage the Chinese to join the IAEA, make a
voluntary offer on safeguards, and play a more active and
responsible role on nonproliferation issues generally.
5.
that:
6.
Since then, the picture has changed for the worse in
(a)
(b)
the PRC has exported nuclear material to
non-NPT states without requiring safeguards:
e.g. heavy water to Argentina and low enriched
uranium (LEU) to South Africa. We and other
Western countries (US, FRG) have protested
officially in Peking;
the People's Republic of China has taken no
further steps to become a member of the IAEA;
they have, in discussion with UK officials,
emphatically rejected any idea of accepting
IAEA safeguards; and meanwhile the Soviet Union has made an offer to accept IAEA safeguards on
some civil nuclear plant on the same basis as the UK, US and France, thus leaving the PRC
exposed as the only Nuclear Weapon state still
refusing to do so.
The proposed sale to the PRC is therefore certain
to attract criticism. It will be alleged that we are acting
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/irresponsibly