CONFIDENTIAL
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DSR 11C
as textiles, while a reversal of our present stance in
other areas such as agriculture would be contrary to
wider British interests.
(c) Action in the UN. There may be political issues on which
individual LDCs are vulnerable to pressure in the UN
(d)
(for example, Indonesia and East Timor). But there will
be few cases where this represents a feasible option.
Quite apart from the importance we attach to demonstrating
patience and consistency in the conduct of our foreign
policy in the UN, we are unlikely to be able to isolate a
Third World country without causing others to close ranks
against us.
Blocking bilateral aid (though in most cases countries
that are willing to risk discrimination against the UK
will not be major recipients). In the short term, this
may have little effect since aid projects usually have
long gestation periods. In the longer run the impact on
the recipient can be severe. But the advantages would
have to be weighed carefully: delay in aid projects will
often result in money already spent being wasted.
(e) Action in the World Bank in the event of discrimination
against UK companies over individual projects.
(f) Legal action under IPPAS where possible.
(g)
Encouraging the promotion of multilateral investment
protection schemes. Previous attempts to establish multi-
lateral arrangements have foundered because of distrust on
the part of LDCs. But a recent revival of interest in
multilateral investment protection in the World Bank could
prove advantageous to the UK.