CONFIDENTIAL
9
DSR 11C
policies including threats and possible counter-measures such
However, past
as aid cuts or other economic sanctions.
experience of sanctions suggests that while they may exert
some influence on the target, the influence is never decisive.
If they are to have much effect they are best applied multi-
laterally; even then enforcement is difficult and it is hard
to maintain solidarity among countries with different trading
interests for any length of time if indeed solidarity can
be achieved in the first place. In most cases sanctions will
be ineffective and the benefit of applying them will rarely
outweight the cost.
19. It would be extremely difficult to restrict exports and
imports to an offending LDC except on a Community basis. And
if the UK alone denies a country goods and services, the country
will turn elsewhere except in those very rare cases where we
have a monopoly of products that are urgently needed. It is
unlikely that the UK will be able to apply unilateral financial
snactions without serious risk of damage to confidence in the
British financial system. Only where one of the less powerful
LDC is dependent on the UK and chooses to embark on a
particularly quixotic course will bilateral sanctions stand
much chance of success. Moreover, there is a risk, where NICS
are concerned, that aggressive UK action could cause NICs to
gang up (for example, through ASEAN).
20. While the bias should be against sanctions, the case for
them should be reviwed in the light of individual circumstances.
Apart from traditional means of protest such as cancelling
ministerial visits and public ocndemnation, possible steps
that might be threatened or taken include the following:
(a) Action through the GATT (which would normally be taken
by the Commission on our behalf). If the relevant