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pursuing an even tougher line.
9. US leverage over China and the high-profile US approach to
human rights issues there, makes China particularly neuralgic to
any sign of US involvement in Hong Kong political issues. The
US/Hong Kong Policy Act 1992 (the McConnell Act) required the
Administration to report regularly to the Congress on a number of aspects of US relations with Hong Kong and on the development of democratic institutions in Hong Kong. China opposed it (rather
ineptly) but dropped the subject after it was passed. The threat
of withholding MFN is a powerful lever (para 13 below). There
are other areas where the US administration has potential
leverage
-
for instance in restricting Chinese access to hi-tech
equipment, or by not backing Chinese bids for loans from domestic
or international financial institutions.
10.
Australia and Canada have also been supportive. Japan has
potential leverage, but is inhibited from using it by historical factors, and self-interest. Our European partners have also shown little sign of being willing to risk Chinese ire by using
much of their influence in our favour. Other Commonwealth
countries lack real leverage with China.
Chinese
11. On multilateral pressure, our options include lobbying
through the G7 Summit; in the EC; and at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). (See Annex for details). re-accession to GATT is another potential pressure point.
Ultimately
-
-
if relations with the Chinese deteriorated to the
extent that we had nothing to lose we could turn to the United
Nations (UN) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Assessment
12.
Many countries have their own economic reasons for
monitoring Chinese policy towards Hong Kong, and forming
judgements about the likelihood of China keeping the promises she
internat.NAT
JEB
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