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have generated support, either public (US, Australia, Canada) or more private (Japan). We have encouraged friendly countries to
speak privately to the Chinese, in support of our policies.
Chinese Fears
6. The Chinese have always been neuralgic about our exchanges with third parties. They seek to restrict international interest in Hong Kong to anodyne expressions of support for the JD, and to minimise the danger that Chinese policy on Hong Kong might become a factor in their relations with other Western countries. They
made an issue of internationalisation at JLG XIV in December
1989. This boiled down to a message that discussion of the future of Hong Kong by HMG with third countries and in international fora was unacceptable. They claim that Hong Kong is a matter for Britain and China until 1997, and an internal
matter for China alone thereafter. (We disagree with this
interpretation; both the JD and international law assure us a continued locus in assuring full implementation of the JD).
7.
The Hong Kong press have reported
-
though subsequently
played down - that the Chinese considered "blatant and
irresponsible internationalisation" as one of 8 contingencies which could provoke them to intervention in Hong Kong pre 1997.
Pressure points
8.
China's public stance is invariably to reject any implication that she would be influenced by international
pressure. But the facts sometimes contradict this. For example, during last year's negotiations with the US on a range of market access issues China maintained that she would not submit to US
pressure. But on the last day before US retaliation took effect, China signed a compromise agreement. There is also evidence that in our current argument with China over Hong Kong, concerns about adverse effects on China's international image and economic reform programme are inhibiting the Chinese leadership from
internat.NAT
JEB
CONFIDENTIAL