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17. Mr Davies summarised the state of China/Taiwan relations,
saying that the burgeoning scale of economic contacts would
presumably lead at some stage to greater political links. We knew little about what was going on privately. China felt
under pressure at the moment, both because of the rise of the
independence lobby within Taiwan, and Taiwan's success in scaling up its external relations. Against this background it.
was perhaps significant that the forthcoming talks were to be held at a higher level and on 'neutral' territory in Singapore,
thus putting both parties on an equal footing. Taiwan was
provoking China further still by its talk of re-entering the
UN. On the other hand, Taiwan was conscious that it stood to
lose its identity if it moved too close to China, and was
itself blocking direct transport links.
North Korea
18. Mr Hum felt that the present restrained approach was
right, allowing scope for bilateral contacts with the North
Koreans, particularly on the part of the US, who had incentives to offer, and China and South Korea, who could apply pressure. The UK was considering the scope for action by the 12, perhaps
offering the carrot of enhanced political relations. Dr Zeller
was sceptical, saying that this would only be effective if the
North Korean motivation was a desire for international
recognition. The time to offer carrots had been at the end of
1991 when the North had made significant strides in its
relations with the South but had gained no recognition for its efforts from the international community. He agreed, though,
that the Security Council route was itself a difficult one.
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