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RECORD OF A CALL BY MR GOODLAD ON LEE KUAN YEW, SENIOR MINISTER, SINGAPORE: 6 APRIL, 1993
Those present:
Lee Kuan Yew
Ng Lang, Western Europe Desk,
1.
MFA
Mr Goodlad
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6.5. Derey'.
Mr Wom
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to see also. ску CKY intersting
as ever on
Deputy High Commissioner PS/Mr Goodlad
longer-term Chinese trends..
Mr Goodlad observed that there had been tremendous changes in the 15 years since he had last visited Singapore. LKY agreed that physical change was still speedy. But this would slow down in 8 or 9 years when all major structures were up. The city should then shift to the south. But life rarely happened as predicted. If the US copied Britain and pulled out of the Pacific region he foresaw big trouble. In 400 years the region had not known stability: if all nations were trying to outdo each other there would be a major diversion of energy and resources.
2. Mr Goodlad asked what the threats were. Except for Cambodia, the region seemed serene. LKY said that local threats were minor. Vietnam and Cambodia had been salutory lessons to the ASEAN nations. But problems would arise from Chinese, Japanese and Korean expansionism if the US was not there to hold the balance. Mr Goodlad observed that the US and UK had enormous non-military interests in the region: US involvement might merely become more economic in character. LKY said that this assumed that the US economy could be turned around. The peace dividend might not be realised if Russia collapsed. The US might ask why they should maintain peace and stability while Japan, Korea and China became economically dominant. Mr Goodlad argued that they would stay because the US position at home would be even weaker if they retreated from the region.
3. LKY said that Chinese expansionism was the biggest worry for the whole region. This was very much on Japanese minds. If China could be stopped through non-cooperation, this was a worthwhile option. But there would need to be a world embargo and China was simply too big and attractive to many countries. The alternative was to feed China with information, technology etc, but slowly. This, however, could create a xenophobic Chinese elite. It could slow Chinese progress by 20-40 years: but they would still become a super-power in the end. The other way was to win China over, as the US had done with Japan and Taiwan, by creating obligations and linkages. Over 40-50 years the same could be done with China For the first time in their
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