1994
Yes. 11
CODE RAD
Mr Riel Kelts,
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Mr Morris asked for comments on Lee Kuan Yew's reported o catementy in the International Herald Tribune of 30-31 January, that neither the United States nor Japan would intervene in the case of a Chinese military blockade of Taiwan because they acknowledge there is only one China. In the case of the United States, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 repealed the Mutual Defence Treaty and other military agreements between the United States and Taiwan which had previously contained security guarantees for Taiwan. Nonetheless, the TRA does contain a number of commitments that would be directly relevant in the case of a Chinese military blockade of Taiwan. Section 2, sub section b(6) of the Act states that it is the policy of the United States "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or any other forms of coercion that would jeopardise the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan". Similarly, in Section 3, which provides for US military sales to Taiwan for defensive purposes, "The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger." The Taiwan Relations Act thus contains specific triggers on which the United States would have to act in the event of the Chinese imposing a military blockade against Taiwan. The question of whether or not the United States acknowledges that there is only one China is not wholly relevant in this case. I do not know of any comparable commitments by the Japanese Government, and I would be surprised if there were any. Nonetheless, if things did reach such a point where the Chinese were taking overt military action against Taiwan in this way, and thus presumably either attacking or impeding vessels from third countries, I cannot see how the international community could avoid taking some action in order to try and defuse the situation. This might be as weak as protesting to the Chinese. But the United States does seem clearly committed to taking stronger action than
that.
2. It is certainly part of the received wisdom that, were Taiwan to attempt to move seriously towards independence, the mainland would use military force to assert its sovereignty. The Chinese are very jealous of their sovereignty. They have refused, and continue to refuse, to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. They have always said that they would do so if Taiwan declared independence or if Taiwan seemed to be falling under the control of another foreign power. We should not dismiss these threats as simply posturing. Nonetheless, it does seem to me that this is something that would build up over a period of time and that the international community would not be suddenly faced with the problem with reacting to Chinese military action against Taiwan. In the build-up period many countries, including very probably the United States and Japan, would see it in their interests as taking action, diplomatic or otherwise, to defuse the situation.
UNCLASSIFIED