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willing to consider what Shattuck had said, accept his lists and respond with their views in due course. Overall, Shattuck thought the Chinese response was as constructive as he could have expected. But he would not commit himself on the chances of the Chinese making sufficient progress to satisfy the MFN criteria, beyond stating that the possibility of MFN withdrawal was real.
Comment
5. All this went down pretty badly in the assembled company. Shattuck was subjected to hostile questioning about whether the MFN Linkage really would secure progress on human rights. Most of those present supported Gordon Wu's argument that economic development was a more effective weapon, and that by undermining this, the withdrawal of MFN would actually damage the cause of human rights
in China (as well as the economy of Hong Kong). It was striking that, in response, Shattuck did not so much try to defend the effectiveness of the policy as to argue that it was an immutable reality of US politics, which all, in China and Hong Kong, had to accept. He must have come away with a strong impression of its unpopularity here. But equally, his stopover in Hong Kong has heightened the sense of pessimistic uncertainty felt by many local observers about the direction of US/CHINA relations, and the likely consequences for Hong Kong itself.
Signed
JOHN ASHTON
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