Urgent Business: Hong Kong, Freedom of Expression and 1997
But there were limits to Hong Kong's dissent. A sternly-worded article in the party newspaper, the People's Daily, warned that while Hong Kong residents were free to advocate any ideas they wished up until 1997, and for 50 years afterwards, they must nevertheless when in the mainland "respect and obey the laws of China".18
While the breakdown of relations with China was most visible in Beijing's campaign of verbal warnings, behind the scenes, mainland Hong Kong policymakers were looking at how best to deal with a precocious and to an unknown degree - politically activated territory.
- One of the first indications of a more assertive strategy came when Xinhua News Agency announced in October 1989 that members of the Standing Committee of the NPC had proposed reintroducing articles in the draft Basic Law prohibiting any "brutal interference in China's internal affairs, including those of Hong Kong", and any use of the territory as "a base for anti-central government activities".1 Albeit in slightly modified language, the final version of the Basic Law under Article 23 compels the post-1997 legislature to enact laws to prohibit acts of "subversion against the Central People's Government".
The tightening in China of its policies towards the handover of Hong Kong appears to have been confirmed at a senior-level meeting on Hong Kong and Macau affairs in Beijing in September 1990. The meeting concentrated on developing the strategies and work of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency, according to the Contemporary, a China-watching magazine.20 Among the main tasks reportedly identified by Xinhua News Agency were the need to establish better control over the independent mass media, and pay particular attention to rebuilding China's image in the territory and to continue to apply the united front policy, especially at a high level (see section 6.4 below).
The September meeting confirmed again that what underlies Beijing's thinking is that the territory is, or has the potential to be, a subversive base against the mainland. However, to achieve the practical objective of changing its poor image, the policy meeting made the first move to soften China's harsh and intimidating language by requiring that the term "subversion" be used solely to criticize anti-China demonstrations, and then only with the permission of the central government.
21
The fundamental objectives continue to remain the same. According to the Contemporary magazine, new five-year policy priorities approved by the State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Working Groups in late 1991 include the expansion of united front work and the need
18 "Hongkong under fire from Beijing leaders", South China Morning Post, 16 June 1989.
19
"Beijing seeks tough curbs on Hong Kong freedoms", The Guardian, 22 Oct. 1989.
20
"Structuring policy towards HK and Macau: the media classified into four groups", Contemporary, 8 Sept. 1990, 4.
21
"HK base for subversives says China", South China Morning Post, 2 Sept. 1990.
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