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3.21
There were no indications that the crew of KE 007 deliberately maintained a constant
magnetic heading.
3.22
3.23
There was a normal, relaxed atmosphere on the flight deck of KE 007.
The proximity of an RC-135 (a United States intelligence aircraft) and KE 007 northeast of Kamchatka Peninsula resulted in confusion and the assumption by the USSR that the aircraft proceeding towards the USSR was an RC-135.
3.24
3.25
USSR military aircraft attempted to intercept KE 007 over Kamchatka Peninsula.
Information was freely available to flight crews that an aircraft penetrating prohibited areas of USSR sovereign airspace over Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island might be fired upon without warning.
3.26
The USSR command centre personnel on Sakhalin Island were concerned with the position of the intruder aircraft in relation to USSR sovereign airspace as well as its identity.
3.27
The time factor became paramount in the USSR command centres as the intruder aircraft was about to coast out from Sakhalin Island.
3.28
Exhaustive efforts to identify the intruder aircraft were not made, although apparently some doubt remained regarding its identity.
3.29
USSR military aircraft intercepted KE 007 over Sakhalin Island.
3.30
It was not possible to assess the distance of the interceptor aircraft from the intruder nor their relative positions when the interceptor's lights were flashed and the cannon fired.
3.31
The USSR military aircraft did not comply with the ICAO standards and recommended practices for interception of civil aircraft before attacking KE 007.
3.32
The USSR air defence command assumed that KE 007 was a United States RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft before they ordered its destruction.
3.33
The military radar installations of the Japanese Defence Agency were aware that an aircraft was tracking into USSR airspace over Sakhalin Island. According to the representatives of Japan, they were not aware that it was a civil aircraft off its intended track.
3.34
According to the representatives of Japan KE 007 was squawking SSR code 1300 when observed by the Japanese military radar.
3.35
It was common practice among flight crews to squawk a non-discrete SSR code ending with zero zero before selecting code 2000 for entry into Tokyo radar controlled airspace in the vicinity of NOHO.