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of KE 015, before discussing, with the flight crew of KE 015, the question of their arrival times in Seoul, the different headwinds being experienced and a change in flight levels. At about 18:15 hours both aircraft were also in contact with Tokyo Radio on HF.
2.15.6
At 18:18 hours the pilot of 805 reported, in response to questions from his ground control, that the target's navigation lights and flashing beacon were on. At 18:19 hours the Soviet ground control instructed the pilot of 805 to flash his lights as a warning signal and to force the intruder to land at Sokol. At 18:20 hours he was instructed to fire a warning burst from his cannon. He reported at 18:19 hours having flashed his lights and at 18:21 hours having fired a burst from the cannon. It was not possible to assess the distance of the interceptor from the intruder nor their relative positions when the interceptor's lights were flashed and the cannon fired. The CVR did not contain any indication that the flight crew of KE 007 was aware in any respect of the interception in progress. Shortly after 18:20 hours KE 007 commenced a climb from FL 330 to FL 350 which it reached at 18:23 hours. The pilot of 805 reported that this climb by the target resulted in his aircraft forging ahead into a position where engagement was not possible.
2.15.7
At 18:22 hours the Soviet command again ordered the destruction of the target. Based on the transcripts it was evident that the time factor became a paramount consideration in the command centres, as the intruder aircraft was about to coast out from Sakhalin Island. Consequently, exhaustive efforts to identify the intruder aircraft were not made, although apparently some doubt remained regarding its identity. The pilot of 805 was instructed to destroy the target with cannon fire but he reported falling back to try with missiles. Two air-to-air missiles were launched by 805 at about 18:25:30 hours. The command instructed ground control to bring 163 into position to ensure the destruction of the target since it was about to exit Soviet airspace. It was reported to the command that the pilot of 805 had fired two missiles and had observed explosions.
2.15.8
Subsequent to the strike by one or two missiles the target was reported to be descending and turning to the right. The plotted radar information showed turns to the left. Ground control expressed concern that the target was still flying, despite being hit by missiles and that having exited Soviet airspace it was re-entering this airspace in the area of Moneron Island. The last plotted radar position of the target was at 18:35 hours at 5 000 metres. The USSR air defence command instructed. ground control to have aircraft 163 and 121 close the target and destroy it with cannon fire. Whilst efforts were made to vector these aircraft onto the target, radar contact with the target was reported lost at 18:37 hours. Reports indicated that at 18:41 hours these interceptors were still searching but that there was no contact with the target. The cloud was full cover at a height of 2 000 metres which made further search impracticable.
2.15.9
The USSR radar positions of KE 007 over Sakhalin Island were plotted every minute or every two minutes. The distance travelled by KE 007 in one minute on the plot varied considerably, for instance the distance between 18:25 and 18:26 hours was about 14 NM, but should have been about 7 NM based on the DFDR data. The radar plot of KE 007 provided by Japan contained a time (18:12 hours) at the beginning of the track and 18:29 hours at the end. Between these times KE 007 changed flight level and after the missile attack at 18:26:02 hours significant changes in heading, speed and altitude took place. Due to these inconsistencies and limited information on the radar plots it was not possible to determine the position of KE 007 at the time of the missile attack in relation to USSR sovereign airspace.