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2.7.3
Further checks from ground-based navigation aids were available in the first half of the oceanic transit to aircraft using R20. St. Paul Island DME should have indicated 140 NM at NABIE, and Shemya VOR and TACAN should have provided cross-bearing and distance checks at NEEVA. These aids were serviceable on 31 August 1983. As a result of the aircraft's deviation from the desired track it is unlikely that the flight crew of KE 007 would have been able to receive these aids but the crew made no report to that effect.
2.8
KE 007 in Alaskan ADIZ and DEWIZ
2.8.1
KE 007 was already outside the boundaries of the bir route when it passed north of Bethel VORTAC. As the aircraft proceeded west, it continued to deviate to the north and, from the track as estimated based on DFDR and radar information, passed approximately 60 NM north of NABIE, 100 NM north of NUKKS and 160 NM north of NEEVA. In 1983 the United States stated that traffic westbound from Alaska to Southeast Asia was not monitored and that there was no requirement for communication between the FAA and the USAF. In January 1993 United States representatives confirmed the situation was applicable as stated in 1983. KE 007 proceeded westbound out of the Alaskan Domestic ADIZ, through the Alaskan DEWIZ and through the Alaskan Air Command buffer zone well north of R20 towards the USSR Asian Coastal buffer zone surrounding Kamchatka and the Komandorski Islands.
2.8.2
The relevant rules (FAR, Part 99) for operating civil aircraft in or out of the Alaskan ADIZ and DEWIZ did not differentiate between eastbound or westbound traffic. The requirements included the filing of a flight plan and reporting the time, position, and altitude at an appropriate reporting point along the route of flight before penetrating an ADIZ. A non-adherence to the rules for ADIZ penetration made an aircraft subject to interception by the United States Air Defence Command for positive identification, and an ADIZ violation would be filed with the FAA.
2.8.3
2.9
2.9.1
According to representatives of the United States:
"[The United States] was unable to uncover any observations of radar returns by either civil or military facilities between 13:00 and 15:00 hours UTC within the Alaskan airspace of a westbound aircraft north of the airways, north of the transoceanic tracks, and crossing the Alaskan Air Command buffer zone.
It
Use of the onboard weather radar for ground mapping
The aircraft weather radar was serviceable and used on the New York to Anchorage sector of flight KE 007. It was common practice for pilots of aircraft equipped with weather radar to observe landfalls, and to assess their navigational accuracy by means of the ground mapping capability of such equipment. Nearby to the left and to the right of route R20, well within the range of weather radar of the type installed on KE 007, were Shemya, the Komandorski Islands, the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuril Islands, with readily discernible topography. Use of the radar on this route was required by some operators. This practice was not required by Korean Air Lines but was common with their crews, although in adverse weather preference was given to using the radar for weather surveillance. Its use would have indicated to the flight crew of KE 007 that the flight was straying to the right of R20. It was concluded that the radar either was not functioning properly or that the ground mapping capability was not used.