End Of Mission Report
J. D. Jamison HOK/9/002-07 Page 8 of 8
4.
5.
necessary.
Clearly, vessels of Hong Kong registry would be subject to any lawful order to exit the area, so that fact does not even need to be explicitly stated in the Plan. In fact, to do so would highlight the issue of legal authority. In the interests of a better planning relationship with the Chinese, it may be prudent for the DBCP to avoid the issue, as there appears to be much to lose and little to gain.
Chapter 3 of the DBCP should be revised to eliminate the suggestion that any unscheduled change in the power generating status of the Daya Bay reactors is a safety-significant event for which Hong Kong authorities should seek an explanation. It is technically inaccurate to assume that a trip or unscheduled shutdown of a nuclear generating unit has any significant relationship to plant safety. It would be imprudent to demand an immediate explanation from the plant staff for such events or to activate the DBCP at any level based on an unscheduled change in plant generating status.
Chapter 1 of the DBCP should be revised to clearly define several levels of DBCP activation, as well as the process by which the level of activation is determined. The emergency class declared by the Daya Bay Station authorities should be one input to the decision process. However, to avoid confusion, the names of the Hong Kong plan activation levels should not be the same as those used by the power station in its emergency declarations (i.e., Plant Emergency, Site Emergency, etc.).