LO
5
of command at the Incident Command post, from there to the Headquarters Command and Control Centre and from there to the GSC (the Governor's Security Committee who actually appeared to be making operational decisions) something had been lost in the telling.
It was not just negotiating that suffered from this lengthy and top heavy command chain but also other tactical areas. To some extent I felt that the process got in the way of the objectives.
GSC
I was very privileged to be allowed to observe GSC. I have already indicated, above, that I felt the members were operating without adequate assessed information. This led to a situation where, in the event of a stalemate in negotiations, a tactical option was all that was left. GSC carefully considered the tactical ability of the RHKP SDU and rightly, in my view, concluded that a two sited tactical option was beyond their capabilities. On that basis GSC (notionally) sought the help of UK Special Forces.
The committee carefully considered the position of the United States in relation to the 'incident' on the US registered ship, in particular as it related to the US doctrine of extra-territoriality. They concluded that the HK government would resist any 'offer' from the US government of US intervention but would accept limited numbers of US advisors. (The same policy was applied to a possible German intervention by GSG9 which somehow crept into the exercise).
Other Matters
The exercise was also observed by an FBI agent who looked specifically at hostage negotiations. A number of US agencies were also 'playing'. The latters' roles had been co-ordinated by the FBI legate in Hong Kong who was highly regarded for his policing skills and his diplomacy.
Conclusions
Negotiators were not used as well as they might have been. This was caused by uncertainty about the role of the Co-ordinator and poor command integration. This is a common problem and one which we consistently encounter in the UK.
I felt that the length of the command chain could have restricted the force's ability to respond quickly to aspects of these incidents. A flatter pyramid with shorter lines of communication and less ambiguity would be helpful. I hope it is not considered an impertinence but the Commissioner seemed to have a direct operational role. I would have thought this might encumber him in projecting the image of the force with the public, advising the Governor and generally taking a more detached role. Whilst the structure of the RHKP remains the way it is, it could be useful to 'short circuit' some of the processes to produce a faster response. It may be that some of the command capacity freed up by the process could be used to form a strategy group/think tank which, whilst having no direct line command could bring their considerable expertise to bear laterally.