different way for the UK.
6. If we take the view that the trade controls only apply to non-Parties which are States, it would, incidentally, follow from this that trade with any of our dependent territories to which the Protocol has not been extended would be similarly outside the control regime.
7.
There is just one point in your minute on which I have some doubts. You suggested in para 3 (a) that Taiwan could be told. that acceptance of the interpretation that their trade is not subject to controls was contingent on their good behaviour. But once we have committed ourselves publicly to a particular legal view we would not be able to change it on such obviously non-legal grounds without destroying our credibility. If there is a possibility of our wishing to change our interpretation for policy reasons, we will need to be very careful not to commit ourselves publicly or in writing to too specific a legal view at this stage. As I see it, once we commit ourselves to the view that Taiwan falls outside the trade controls in the Protocol, we will have lost all the leverage against Taiwan which the Protocol might have provided. Some other means, outside the framework of the Protocol, would need to be found of exerting pressure on Taiwan to control its CFC production.
For the same reason, I would also query Mr Fletcher's statement in his letter to Mrs Hogwood of 14 January that following the option (a) approach would allow us to keep up the pressure on Taiwan over its CFC policies. He also referred (on page 2 of his letter) to the option of taking firmer measures if Taiwan does not in fact follow appropriate policies.
I am not clear what sort of measures he has in mind, and would be grateful for clarification.
8.
та
Jill Barrett
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