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5.
The question of instigating a public procedure is likely to arise again at UNCHR 48. This will need careful consideration. While not wishing to hold back from public criticism, there is a risk that the SLORC would not cooperate with such a procedure, thus denying the international community the limited window on the human rights situation in Burma which the 1503 Procedure has allowed. A public position on Burma at next year's UNGA might be more suitable, and is provided for by the 1991 UNGA resolution.
UN Agencies
6. With the Western aid suspension, the only outside support reaching the Burmese people comes through the politically neutral UN agencies (especially UNDP, UNICEF). UNICEF concentrates on primary health care which is an urgent need in Burma. UNDP's role is controversial. They are in the final stages of agreeing a second five-year plan for long-term development projects. Their projects in the border areas have been criticised as they have allowed the Burmese Army to enter and control areas previously controlled by rebel groups. Arguably the projects have also allowed aid to reach Burmese people who have been isolated for forty years.
7. The UN agencies are aware of sensitivity over the allocation of UN money to Burma which may be misused by the SLORC, who neglect their population while allocating large sums to the purchase of arms. But their hands are often tied by UN obligations to cooperate with the host country. It is important that they carefully target their projects and press hard to secure the best possible local conditions to ensure the fruits of their work benefit the Burmese population.
Trade Sanctions
8.
We have resisted calls for trade sanctions against Burma as they would be ineffective without support from Burma's major Asian trading partners. This support is not forthcoming. Sanctions would in any case be very difficult to enforce as much trade is unofficial and Burma's long borders are poorly patrolled by often corrupt officials.
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