C

SECRET

021/1

RECEIVE

A JUI 1993

37

152637

MDHOAN 4217

CISTRY

USTRY ..on Taker,

ра

6 marthly

SECRET

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

TELNO 576

OF 111636Z JUNE 93

INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING, UKREP JLG HONG KONG

1449

448

YOUR TELNO 913 AND PEKING TELNO 775: HONG KONG:

CHINESE: STRATEGY

TALKS WITH THE

1. I was grateful for the thoughts in TURS about the gameplan up to the summer break.

2.

On an OPD (K) meeting, the Prime Minister has now agreed that this should be held on 1 July, and that you and Sir R McLaren should both attend. We are consulting you on a draft memorandum. I agree with you that careful consideration will be needed about when and how we announce your return to London. Sir David Ford made the point to us in discussions here on 7 June that the press (and the Chinese) will be all too likely to interpret the meeting as a sign that we are preparing to compromise. I suggest that we should aim to present it as a routine stock-taking occasion (and unattributably to sow the seed that we are beginning to lose patience at the slow pace of the negotiations). In terms of the timing of an announcement that you will be returning to London you might like to bear in mind that there is an oral PQ down for 16 June (although it is unlikely to be reached for oral answer) asking when I next plan to meet you. That could be the vehicle for announcing here that you plan to return to London on 1 July (the Fifth Round would by then just have ended in Peking).

3.

On the possibility of my visiting Peking immediately after the G7 Summit in Tokyo, we have agreed that we should review after the Fifth Round of talks whether such a visit would be useful. If i decide to gop to Peking, I would want to avoid getting drawn into any detailed negotiation and in particular to avoid any public impression that I was taking a different tack from the one you have been following. From that point of view, your attendance at OPD (K) will be helpful. In Peking, I would envisage deploying a careful speaking note sketching out the way forward, in the light of the conclusions reached at OPD (K), but Leaving it to the negotiators to take forward the detail. might also be useful for a senior Hong Kong Government

It

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