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countries also upgraded their representation in Taiwan 2 or 3
years ago. The position of other Western countries is now not
very different from our own, although France and Germany have
already sent Cabinet rank Ministers to Taiwan and France has sold
defence equipment (on which more below). China now seems to
accept the division between political and commercial contacts.
It knows that any objections to commercial contacts are unlikely
to have much effect anyway and could undermine its own growing
trade relationship with the West.
5.
Our responsibility for Hong Kong and China's sensitivity
about the Hong Kong/Taiwan axis (exacerbated in the past by
Taiwanese mischief making in-and about-Hong Kong) makes us more
vulnerable to Chinese pressure than our partners. But despite
this, we have changed in the last few years from a policy of
almost nil contact with the Taiwan authorities to one in which
there is a steady series of governmental contacts with only a
small and shrinking figleaf to cover them. A factor in our
favour is that China is interested in demonstrating the success
of the "one country two systems" policy in Hong Kong as a stepping stone to eventual reunification with Taiwan. This does not prevent China being touchy about any signs of increased
formal contact between Hong Kong and Taiwan, but is a potentially
useful backdrop to our own steady build up of ties.
Constraints.
6. There are however some limits to how far we can go, These
are both legal and political. They fall into two main areas:
a)
acts which would imply recognition of the Taiwan
authorities as a Government.
b)
SBTAIWAN
the whole question of defence cooperation and defence
sales, on which the Taiwanese have been pressing in the
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