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side whose fear and contempt of representative democracy and the
rule of law was made all too painfully clear by the Tiananmen
events of June 4th 1989.
The difficulties can best be seen in considering the actions
of the leaders of the United Democrats of Hong Kong and the
reactions of the Chinese and the British to them. For their part
any delay in implementing, or any backtracking from the
principles of full representative democracy, have been portrayed
as a betrayal by the British and as evidence of their kowtowing
to the Communist Chinese authorities. Their leaders Martin Lee
and Szeto Wah had been prominent in giving material support to
the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in the Spring of 1989 and
they had assisted some of the dissidents in escaping after the
crackdown of June 4th. The Chinese authorities have since
denounced them as subversives. Such is the fear of the Chinese
authorities that they introduced into the subsequent draft of
their Basic Law for the territory a special clause outlawing
subversion of the mainland. Although they were no lovers of
Western democracy before June 1989, the first draft of the Basic
Law (that in other respects was more restrictive) did not have
that clause. In the first direct elections to the Legislative
Council held in 1991 the UDHK won 16 of the 18 seats (out of a
total of 60 in the council) and Beijing supported candidates did
not win a single seat. That result did not endear the democratic
process in hong Kong to the Chinese authorities.
Before the advent of Patten the British negotiators and the