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CONFIDENTIAL
China had been positive. was not yet known.
But the focus of their final report The Secretary of State would give. evidence in January. DTI work on the proposed Joint Commission for Trade was continuing, but the timing depended on the Hong Kong angle. Mr Hum hoped Mr Lever might lead a team to China for bilateral talks on political issues (eg peacekeeping, proliferation). Japan, the USA and Australia were already re-engaging China: as far as possible we should also maintain a range of contracts.
HONG KONG
11. Mr Ricketts said China had moved enough at the last round to cause a rethink on the OPD (K) paper for 10 November. It might prove possible to achieve a first-stage agreement in the next few weeks. But agreement on the remaining issues was less certain. A Chinese move on the 'Through Train' ruling out retroactive discrimination against Legco members would be a real signal. If a first-stage agreement was possible, legislation on other issues might be delayed to February/March. No agreement would mean unilateral action to table legislation in December. We should brief Japan and the USA on Hong Kong issues before their meeting with Jiang Zemin at APEC in Seattle. On HMOCS, an early compromise settlement might now be possible. To hang on longer might weaken HMOCS' position. The Minister agreed.
KOREA
12. Mr Fry said there was no new intelligence on Korea. There seemed to be a little more US use of the stick rather than (as in recent months) the cannot. A sitrep for the Secretary of State was in preparation. You said it was important to keep track of the Washington debate and flag up our interest to the State Dept. Mr Goodlad asked for an early office meeting on North Korea. He hoped to visit in
1994.
TAIWAN
13. Mr Fry reported the proposed BAe joint venture still alive. But further progress might not be possible until after local elections later this month. BAe were not seeking political help. But the debate was preventing further positive political moves towards Taiwan. Mr Goodlad thought we should try to relax our position on arms sales to Taiwan provided we were acting consistently with guidelines published elsewhere and could do so without offending China. Mr Fry realised that he owed a submission on this issue. The Minister should not yet meet the Taipei London Office representative. No Ministerial visits to Taiwan were foreseen but a Cabinet Minister might visit if the BAe talks
CONFIDENTIAL