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3.
the
MFN
09
Mr. Rubin confirmed that the Administration's policy had not
yet been formed on MFN. He did not know in detail what was in the President's mind though he could guess. Tony Lake, Lloyd Bentsen, Sandy Berger, warren Christopher, winston Lord and Rubin himself
would all have a major say in the final policy. He asked Governor wnat he thought the Chinese reaction would be
conditions were introduced by the Executive which were not
abstract as to be irrelevant but were not so tightly defined that
they would prove difficult for the Chinese to meet. The Governor
said that much would depend on the way any conditions were framed
or worded. The NCNA would probably denounce any form of conditions
but if they were clearly achievable and couched in the form of
positive expectations rather then sanctions the Chinese could probably swallow it. It had to be remembered that economically the US was the only country China really cared about. Even what Japan
said and did mattered to them much less. The key figures in Peking dealing with foreign trade and economic issues Qian Qichen, Zhu
Rongji and Li Lanqing were by and large intelligent and rational
people who would be watching out for China's best interests.
M
A
Mr. Rubin asked whether, if the Administration went down the
route of Executive-led conditions, this should be discussed in
advance with the Chinese. The Governor said it would be prudent to forewarn the Chinese of what the Administration planned to do but
not to get bogged down in too much discussion of specifics.
5.
The Governor asked whether there was still time to derail the
Mitchell and Pelosi bills by introducing an Executive order with
rather milder, less specific conditions. Mr. Rubin said that this was certainly possible both technically and politically but
would entail serious discussion with the relevant interested
parties in Congress,
it
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