BRIT EMB WASHINTON I
TUE 64 MAY 93 20:12
PG.06
CONFIDENTIAL
Confidential
GOVERNOR'S MEETING WITH ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE CLIFTON WHARTON AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE WINSTON LORD, STATE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., 3 MAY
Present
Acting Secretary Wharton
Assistant Secretary Lord
Under Secretary Joan Spero
U.S. Consul-General to HK, Richard Williams Consul-General designate, Richard Mueller Other State Department officials
Governor
HMA Washington Mr. Dinham
1. Mr. Wharton welcomed the Governor to State Department and proposed that the meeting should pursue in more detail the Hong Kong issues which had been covered in the Governor's meeting with the President that morning. He invited Mr. Lord to set out the Administration's position on MFN.
2. Mr. Lord said he wanted to be as frank as possible so he asked that what he said should be treated confidentially. From the President down, everyone concerned in the Administration understood and accepted the importance of the Hong Kong factor in the U.S. decision-making process on MFN, This was even more the case after what he depicted as the excellent meeting the Governor had had that morning with the President. But as the Governor himself had noted there were many other factors to be taken into account, such as human rights, the trade deficit with China and
China and proliferation issues. There were a number of constituencies in Congress with different approaches on MFN and conditionality. Some felt that no action on MFN was needed. China was moving in the right direction and simply needed to be encouraged during that route. Others advocated a tough stand with China on human rights and other issues, but did not see MFN as the appropriate lever to achieve this. Others thought that MFN, because of its overriding economic importance to China, was precisely the weapon to use. The background to all these constituencies was the President's commitment to conditioning MFN made during the election campaign.
3.
MI.
Lord went on to say that the Administration saw the downside of conditions. It understood the serious consequences to Hong Kong if MFN were revoked. It recognised too that economic sanctions of this nature could well hurt the wrong people in China. But it also saw that, if used selectively and intelligently, MFN could
highly a
effective lever on China.
So the Administration's basic approach was to use that leverage to ensure progress on issues of concern to the U.S., but not to lose MFN in
be
the
How to achieve
that, pray
CONFIDENTIAL