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5. Despite several references the paper to ingrained Chinese suspicions surfacing from time to time and the fact that the negotiations were undoubtedly difficult, the Chinese are likely to less cooperative in a 1993 working group than they were in 1984. By June 1984 we had conceded, albeit reluctantly, the key sovereignty point. We have not made an equivalent concession this time. The initial atmosphere is not therefore likely to particularly good and it will be hard to build up the relationship of confidence and mutual respect which the paper identifies as necessary elements of a successful negotiation.
The
6. The working group moved pretty slowly at first, and we should be prepared for a similar experience this time around. When it did get going it was found that the most productive way forward was to deal with the easier questions first and leave the thornier ones aside (for resolution in plenary if necessary). process was also helped along by carefully timed high level interventions (usually by the Secretary of State). we should be prepared for explicit and implicit bargaining (the latter usually in the slower stages). If Chinese concerns "of principle" can be met, they are often likely to be more flexible over details.
7. There is likely to be even less room for fudging in this set of negotiations than there was in 1984. We will be dealing with detailed electoral arrangements, and phrases like the classic that Hong Kong's legislature should be constituted "by elections" will not be possible. This will make it more difficult for the really problematic issues to be got round.
for
8. The paper draws a number of practical conclusions example the need to negotiate texts simultaneously in English and Chinese to prevent the Chinese getting a second bite at the cherry, the need to have made careful preparations and to to be able to react rapidly, the need for skilled interpretation and so
on.
9.
On the whole we were quite pleased with the outcome of the 1984 working groups. We got into the Joint Declaration a lot more detail than seemed possible at one time. We seemed, and this is only an impression of mine, to feel more confident in fast moving negotiations than in the long drawn one ones the Chinese seem to prefer. I suspect that the Chinese assessment may not be that different from ours. They may feel that we were able to get away with too much in the JD working group and will not want the same to happen again. They see us now as tricksters and will be a lot more careful before agreeing to anything either in a working group (even if they agree to the concept) or in plenary.
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RF Wye