17.
18.
19.
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20. I SAID THAT CHANGING THE SCENERY IN THIS WAY WAS POSSIBLE
BUT THERE WERE SOME DOWNSIDES.
HAD PUT THE TACTICAL ISSUES WELL AND I AGREED WITH HIS CONCLUSION. WE SHOULD TRY TO FIND A FORMULA TO GET ROUND A CORNER WHICH HAD NOT BEEN REMOTELY OF OUR OWN MAKING. IF WE JUST GAVE IN, PEOPLE WOULD ASK WHY WE HAD TAKEN THE DECISION WE DID ON 12 MARCH.
21. I WAS RATHER DOUBTFUL ABOUT RAISING THE AIRPORT AND THE JLG NOW BECAUSE I DID NOT WANT CHINA TO PERCEIVE A LINK WHICH DID NOT
EXIST. WHILE I SAW THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT LETTING THE CHINES KNOW OUR DEADLINE, THEIR KNEE-JERK REACTION COULD WELL BE TO INSIST ON PUSHING US BEYOND IT IF IT WERE MENTIONED. OUR DEADLINE SHOULD IN FACT ALREADY BE KNOWN TO THEM FROM ALL THAT HAD BEEN SAID IN PUBLIC.
22.
I PROPOSED THE WORKING IN MY TELNO 492 FOR A PUBLIC
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THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN CLOSED UNDER
FOI EXEMPTION NO....^7@)