JUD RUNO KUFIM.
30 March 1993
SECRET
20
ir
British Senior Repr
By fax
PP Ricketts Esq
HKD
FCO
NH13013
ут ра
fir I Goles
S. Ber
St John's Brubing. Ad Li
33 Garden: Kooni
Telephone (ag?? 2017:
Facsimile
Mr Hum.
!
isten
Same intersting divergences from our
assumptions here
HONG KONG: DISCUSSION PAPER
Rohell
2013
1. Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 29 March to Martin Dinham covering your discussion paper.
2. AS I think you know, I differ from you to a certain extent in ay assessment of the relative strategic merits of the options. Specifically, I do not think that talks which were subsequently broken off have any serious chance of producing the consequences
Listed in your para 7(i). I think they are more likely to exacerbate relations with Peking and to provoke a reaction which would go beyond the reaction if we were to go ahead with introduction to LegCo now (admittedly, it would be very strong in both cases). Breaking off talks which had once been set up would be 2 new public act of defiance by us towards Peking, and i think it would attract the severer sentence which you would expect from a judge in the case of a criminal who has not only not reformed, but committed the same offence twice.
3.
Conversely I think the judgement in 7(iv) that the Chinese would be predisposed to react harshly to the outcome of the legco debate simply because they had had no part in it, and do not recognise LegCo, is somewhat superficial. Of course those considerations would be factors, but at the same time, if LogCo took steps to water down the proposals in order to bring them into line with the Basic Law, and particularly it they seemed to be giving the Governor a rebuff in doing so, the Chinese would be faced with quite a dilemma. Do they themselves rebuff the efforts of compatriots in Hong Kong, even though members of the British Legislative Council, to bring the Governor back into line with the Basic Law? Do they abandon those in the
Legislative Council they have been cultivating? I think 1 would transpose to this section the possible advantage which you list. in para (1) that even if the chinese did not overtly accept the result, their reaction would be moderated by these
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considerations.
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