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They could opt for a policy of wider non-cooperation. Within that broad approach there would be considerable scope for calibration, on a spectrum from passive resistance (no answer to our requests for agreement on specific matters in the JLG, no
agreement on airport financing, or land disposals above the 50 hectares a year laid down in the JLG) to active harassment (not accepting return of illegal immigrants, a blind eye to cross-border criminal activity, harassment of shipping etc). This would probably be combined with efforts to undermine the loyalty and effectiveness of the Civil Service eg by threatening to weed out in 1997 those who are associated with controversial HKG policies. This would be part of a broader effort to marginalise HKG, and build up the widest possible coalition of groups (including the business community) who saw their interests as lying with the future sovereign power. Even in these circumstances, the Chinese side would probably maintain contact over financial issues, and others where it was clearly in their interest to do so. They would also step up the
pressure on HMG though retaliation against British business in China.
11. On the evidence so far, the third option at present looks the most likely. The prospect is for a difficult four years, with HKG facing a series of decisions as to how far it can proceed on specific issues in the absence of Chinese agreement (the airport saga is a foretaste).
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Hongkongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH
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