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They could opt for a policy of wider
non-cooperation. Within that broad approach there would be considerable scope for
calibration, on a spectrum from passive
resistance (no answer to our requests for
agreement on specific matters in the JLG, no agreement on airport financing, or land disposals above the 50 hectares a year laid down
in the JLG) to active harassment (not accepting
return of illegal immigrants, a blind eye to
cross-border criminal activity, harassment of
shipping etc). This would probably be combined
with efforts to undermine the loyalty and
effectiveness of the Civil Service eg by
threatening to weed out in 1997 those who are
associated with controversial HKG policies.
This would be part of a broader effort to marginalise HKG, and build up the widest possible coalition of groups (including the
business community) who saw their interests as lying with the future sovereign power. Even in these circumstances, the Chinese side would
probably maintain contact over financial issues,
and others where it was clearly in their
interest to do so. They would also step up the pressure on HMG though retaliation against
British business in China.
11.
On the evidence so far, the third option at present looks the most likely. The prospect is for a difficult four years, with HKG facing a series of decisions as to how far it can proceed on specific issues in the absence of
Chinese agreement (the airport saga is a foretaste).
HMG
HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH
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