SECRET
- to try to make agreement on principles a pre-requisite for any discussion of electoral arrangements let alone an understanding on these issues. They may demand our agreement that we
will not put forward legislation in LegCo until
we have reached agreement with them; and that any arrangements put to LegCo must be consistent with the (Chinese interpretation of the) Basic
Law and the exchange of letters and lead to convergence with post-1997 arrangements. They may well object to LegCo having any right to amend an agreement reached in the talks;
- if we succeed in moving the talks on to practical issues, to insist on discussing the full range of electoral arrangements. In this context the Chinese may raise objections to most
or all of the Governor's proposals;
to refuse to put any alternatives of their own
on the table and to look to us to do so;
- to use our wish to avoid indefinite delay as a means of pressure on us to settle close to their
terms.
Annex A sets out a detailed line to take for use in response to
these points.
4.
We expect the Chinese would only be prepared to acquiesce publicly in a revised package emerging from the talks if it represented a significant modification of the Governor's proposals, at least on the two key issues (functional constituencies and the Election Committee). If we were to decide to go ahead unilaterally with amendments to the
steeringbrief15.2
NH
SECRET