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conclusion is minimal, (ii) the Chinese reaction to our
breaking-off talks would be more severe than if we introduced the Bill into LegCo without talks, and (iii) if talks failed HKG would face a dilemma as to what proposals to introduce into LegCo.
9. These are matters of judgement which require further
discussion. But they may turn out to be moot, since both
schools accept that the current mood in the Hong Kong
community obliges us to make an effort to get talks underway. It will be difficult to win community support
for introducing the Bill into LegCo unless we can show that
we have made a sincere effort to hold talks. The Chinese
may take this bait, whether or not it is offered willingly.
Both schools also agree that talks are most unlikely to
produce an understanding with China. The remainder of this
paper therefore considers how the Chinese might react to non-agreement over electoral issues, and the implications
for our governance of Hong Kong.
What are the Chinese Likely to Do?
10.
Chinese decisions will be affected by a range of
factors, particularly: the nature of the eventual LegCo package and how much they are perceived to have influenced
it; the international dimension, particularly the state of
their relations with the US; and views within the
leadership in Peking. But there are broadly three levels
of reaction:
www.w
They could reserve their position on whether to
allow the LegCo through train to run, and pursue
preparations in fairly low-key of alternative
arrangements.
This is the most optimistic end of
HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH
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