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emerge from LegCo unamended or only marginally amended, we must
expect the Chinese to return to confrontation, and at the least
to set up the advisory body foreshadowed by Lu Ping.
They could
well revert to some of the more extreme measures they had earlier
contemplated whatever the political and economic cost. We could then face four difficult years in Hong Kong.
7. In pursuing our objective of electoral arrangements for 1995 which are fair, open and command widespread support in Hong Kong,
we therefore need to avoid two pitfalls:
amending the Governor's proposals in a way which loses
the support of the liberals in LegCo (without
necessarily winning that of other groups) and provokes
serious criticism in Westminster.
8.
winning the battle in LegCo but losing the war, by
triggering Chinese hostility and non-cooperation for the remaining years of British rule.
Some difficult judgements will be needed in due course. But for the present, the Governor and I consider that we should proceed as follows.
The
9. The Governor should put draft legislation to LegCo as planned in February. The main proposals should be unchanged, to sustain liberal support. The Governor proposes to make one fairly modest change: allowing District Boards and Municipal Councils to
co-opt local worthies as non-voting advisers. This would
demonstrate that we were listening to reasonable criticism.
Governor has also considered the idea of adopting a proposal put forward in Hong Kong that voters should be able to vote either in
a geographical or functional constituency but not (as at present)
in both. But this would be opposed by at least some of the
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