JERMENT HOUSE HONG KONG.
MON 68 NOU 93 68:35
CONFIDENTIAL
PG.06
6. He added that he had always feared that once negotiations started with the Chinese we would get sucked into an endless process of compromise and backsliding. All his worst fears were now being confirmed. I agreed that that had always been a risk, but reminded him that everyone in the community, including him, had publicly supported the idea of talks at the time.
7.
He said he had been dismayed to learn of the extent of the concessions that had already been made in the negotiations with the Chinese. He claimed that he had been given an undertaking that he would be consulted at every crucial stage in the negotiations, before any concessions were offered, but this had not in fact happened. The UDHK could never support the 1993' proposals.
He said that a key point for him was that the Governor's 1992 proposals for individual voting for all workers in the functional constituencies would have given the UDHK the chance to compete successfully in each of them: they would have created in effect 19 more directly elected seats. The compromise proposals destroyed this possibility. They would preserve the worst features of the existing system because it would be possible for the Chinese and their supporters to manipulate the result.
9.
He then quoted an example of how Chinese pressure could be brought to bear in FC elections. When Philip Wong (whom Martin described as a "self confessed criminal") had stood in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce election against the incumbent, Ho Sai-chu, the latter had originally wanted to contest the seat. But Chinese pressure had been brought to bear and Ho backed down. Ho Sai-chu had admitted to Martin Les personally that he had done so because of his business's dependence on the Chinese. If they boycotted him, he would be ruined.
10. The Chinese objective in the negotiations, he thought, was to deny the UDHK the means to gain a majority in Legco, and to ensure that they could influence, if not control, a majority of LegCo members. As things now stood, it looked as if the UDHK's only hope would be in the directly elected geographical constituencies; and even here the other parties would be forming electoral pacts to minimise the UDHK's chances. For this reason he did not expect that UDHK would be able to repeat their 1991
success.
11. As for the Through Train, he agreed that this was important in the sense that without the assurance of this, there was no point in talking to the Chinese in the first place. But it was not an issue that should be traded for concessions in the rest of the package. There was no point in having a Through Train if the carriages were defective. And there was no point in having a Through Train for all but one or two passengers.
The effect on
the self confidence of the rest of his party if, say, he and Szeto Wah, were asked to get off the Train would be very serious.
CONFIDENTIAL