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our legal
a
advice, even if the Chinese wanted to turn
blind eye to BL 67, they might not be able to
This is because any elector in Hong Kong
do so.
can mount a court challenge (under the existing
after 1997 to seek to disqualify any
legislation)
(or all)
elected Legco members
who are believed
specified in the
to have exceeded the 20% limit
Basic Law.
(b) Given (a), our choice is either to leave the matter
entirely to the Chinese, or seek to influence the way
the provision is to be
in 1997.
implemented by the Chinese
If we leave the matter entirely to the
Chinese,
they
implementation
are likely to formulate
arrangement which is
neither fair
an
nor open.
Moreover, such an arrangement may also
set
a
pattern for
the
that arrangements
will be
needed after
1997
to
ensure
that subsequent
SAR legislatures are compatible with BL 67.
(c)
It
also may
public relations
be unattractive in negotiating/
terms to have taken the initiative
to discuss the
through train arrangements
whilst
refusing to have anything to do with BL 67.
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to
Our
The Chinese have raised BL 67, not entirely without
reason, as one of the pre-conditions and an essential
component of a comprehensive through train.
refusal to discuss BL 67 might be used by the Chinese
justify their continued refusal to discuss the
criteria for confirming Legco members for upholding
the BL.
In the event of a breakdown in the talks,
the Chinese would argue publicly that our refusal
to discuss BL 67 was (one of) the reasons for the
failure to reach an agreement on the through train.
The Case against Engagement
11. (a) The mess is not of our own making: we have warned
the Chinese in 1990 that the 20% nationality rule
could lead to discontinuity
It may not actually happen.
between 1995 and 1997.
Indeed, it is quite
any action to implement
possible that even without
the rule before 1997, no more than 20%/% of the
1995 Legco seats would be
by 1997.
filled by "foreigners"
(b) If
to
we discuss with the Chinese now a way (for them)
the rule in 1997, it weakens our case
implement
for refusing to have anything to do with it in 1995,
or even in
1997. The Chinese will in any case not
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Merge et en TVEZEdu
allow us a
role in determining how the rule will be
implemented in 1999 and afterwards, since they would
a matter solely between them and the
regard that as
future SARG.
(c) The Chinese accusation is
C
in any case likely to be
genuine
reason.
It is
an excuse rather than a
by no means clear that the gap between us on the
electoral
arrangements (EC, FC, etc.) are bridgeable,
or that there is any
possibility of an agreement
on
the
"through train"
criteria.
In
PR terms
(in the
take
event of a breakdown of the talks), we could
the line that for the reasons set out in para. 5
above, it is impossible for us to implement the rule
in 1995, but that we have not objected to the Chinese
implementing it in 1997 if the circumstances SO
warrant.
12.
The case for and against
is finely balanced.
engaging the Chinese now
Ultimately, it turns on to what extent
our
continued refusal
discussion
on
how to
to engage the Chinese in a serious
implement the rule in 1997 is really
an impediment to reaching an agreement on the through train
criteria.
So long
the as
Chinese continue
to
refuse
to discuss with
us the through train criteria before the gap
G.F. 316
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