SECRET
125460
MDHIAN 7973
degree of subjective judgement; they are not scientific. But common sense does not suggest we are stampeding the process, rather that the risks are all on the other side.
6.
Even without these technical considerations, the political arguments against separation are powerful enough to carry the debate. We have conducted the negotiation so far against the background of the December deadline. Our concessions major moves - have been paced accordingly. We have now agreed to make a further major move at Round 13. A vital part of our strategy had been to make it clear that we are under real deadline pressure. You did this with Qian. I shall do it with LegCo tomorrow. I argued in my telno 1559 that we need to bring this home even more plainly to the Chinese. To look, at this stage, for ways of finessing the deadline (even if it were technically feasible), would be to risk unravelling our negotiating strategy. We would ease the pressure on the Chinese at the very time we should be tightening it. The major concessions that we have already made, and the one we propose to make in Round 13, would have been deployed at the wrong time in the context of an extended negotiating timetable, and we would have negligible cards in our hand for the rest of the game.
7. The assumptions behind the idea of separation (which has been fairly widely discussed here, including in ExCo today) are (a) that we could readily reach agreement on the 1994 agreements, and (b) that we might buy enough time to bridge a gap which, as I said in my telno 1559 paragraph 2, does not appear to be bridgeable. In fact there is no sign that the 1994 arrangements would be readily agreed. I would expect the Chinese to press us hard for concessions; it would be astonishing if they were
they were to take the pressure off us by letting a 1994 package go through unscathed. they might make real difficulties over matters which have, so far, not loomed large as sticking points. And in order to get a 1994 agreement we would have to make concessions which we might not have to make in an overall 1994/95 agreement if that were attainable, and which would be difficult to get through LegCo. Moreover, if
the Chinese position is as stark as
as stark as it appears to be, I see no reason for hope that it might soften if only we could buy a few extra months. Even assuming that changes got underway with immediate effect within the Chinese Leadership, it is hard to imagine any scenario in which policy on Hong Kong would evolve as quickly as we would need.
So
PAGE
SECRET
3
THIS IS A COPY THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN CLOSED UNDER
FOI EXEMPTION NO........... 27 (1)
10 10 10